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THE END OF TECHNOLOGY: A POLEMIC
Louis E. Wolcher*
Abstract: This essay is a philosophical polemic against the essence of modem
technology. The piece does not advance a Luddite's agenda, however, since it describes
modem technology's essence as technological thinking, rather than as the manifold of
technical instruments and processes. Technological thinking is not just careful planning
towards well thought-out ends. Rather, it is an entire orientation to life, and as such it is a
monstrosity: it relentlessly and heartlessly transforms the world's beings, including human
beings, into measurable units of production and consumption that are constantly being judged
for their contributions to "productivity." Nature is thus made into a vast warehouse, and
humanity into a standing reserve of "human resources." Absent from technological thinking
is any reflection on technology's end, in the sense of its ultimate purpose. A synthesis of the
thinking of Heidegger, Marcuse, Weber, and Sorel, this essay claims that the ultimate end of
technology as such is, and ought to be, freedom for responsibility, and that freedom from
necessity is both a condition and a consequence of this. It argues that there is a desperate
need for thought and speech to break with technological thinking, and to begin bringing the
means of modem technology into contact with its ultimate end.
"The sadness of nature makes her mute."--Walter Benjamin

I.

THE END OF TECHNOLOGY: ASKING THE QUESTION

What is the end of technology? Although this question does not mean
to ask when technology will end, in the sense of ceasing to exist, it
nonetheless remains ambiguous in an interesting and productive way.
Consider the "end of technology" understood as technology's limit. On
this reading, the question asks for a determination of the logical endpoint of technology: the limit, or boundary, that circumscribes
technology as a concept and allows it to stand forth in thought and
speech as a comprehensible whole. Since it is impossible to comprehend
a phenomenon like technology in this way without paying attention to its
social context, this means that technology's logical end is inextricably
linked to its end in another sense: purpose. When we notice a thing we
tend to notice it as something. We notice a telephone as equipment for
. Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law, William H. Gates
Hall, Box
353020, Seattle, Washington 98195. E-mail address: wolcher@u.washington.edu.
1. WALTER BENJAMIN, On Language as Such and on the Language of Man, in REFLECTIONS:
ESSAYS, APHORISMS, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITINGS 314, 329 (Edmond Jephcott trans., 1978).
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calling someone, a house as a place for humans to dwell, a pencil as a
utensil to write with, and so forth. What a thing is, and what a thing is
for, comprise two sides of the same coin. Thus, it would appear that the
purpose of technology, together with a determination of what technology
is, gives critical reason an important and singularly synthetic question to
think: What is the end of technology?
We live in an age that has been aptly called the "second industrial
revolution.",2 Unlike the first one, the second industrial revolution is
characterized primarily by the fact that scientific discoveries are
translated routinely and almost immediately into new procedures of
production and distribution-new ways to dominate nature's beings and
to control human behavior. Domination and control are not necessarily
bad things to strive for, of course. As Herbert Marcuse observes, the
instruments of technology by themselves "can promote authoritarianism
as well as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as well as
the abolition of toil."'3 As concepts, however, domination and control do

shed some light on the meaning of our question. Sadism aside, the
phenomena of domination and control belong to the category of means
rather than the category of ultimate ends. To inquire about the end of
technology is thus to ask for it to be determined in such a manner that
we can understand what Aristotle called its final cause: its purpose for
being what it is. 4 In short, what, ultimately, is technology aiming at?
Technology's ultimate end is not the same as the sum of its technical
performances. Marcuse rightly distinguishes the paraphernalia of
modem technology ("technics") from the totality of technics and their
modes of organizing and changing social relationships, prevailing
thoughts, and behavior patterns ("technology").5 If one were to say that
the purpose of the telephone is to speak with people at a distance, that of
the Internet to provide instantaneous access to information, and that of
the automobile to travel rapidly from here to there, all of these particular
ends would remain merely intermediate. One is still entitled to ask what
the ultimate point is of having instruments that allow us to speak with
people at a distance, gain instantaneous access to information, and make
2. HERBERT MARCUSE, TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY 118 (Douglas Kellner ed.,

2001).
3. HERBERT MARCUSE, TECHNOLOGY, WAR AND FASCISM 41 (Douglas Kellner ed., 1998).
4. 1 ARISTOTLE, Posterior Analytics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 114, 155
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984); see also Richard Taylor, Causation, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 56, 56 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
5. See MARCUSE, supra note 3, at 41.
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all of our journeys rapidly. In technology, as in other things, the most
obvious truth is often the least visible: the question concerning the
meaning and justification of technology is not itself a technological
6
question.
We are used to calculating in terms of intermediate ends, and only
rarely do we ever really think about ultimate ends. Indeed, this allocation
(or misallocation) of our mental energies may be one of the prime effects
of modern technology, which tends towards the production of what
Horkheimer and Adorno call "purposiveness without purpose.",7 Getting
an education that teaches useful job-skills, earning a living, becoming
successful by conventional measures of income and status, and so
forth-we must not let the self-evident desirability of these ends obscure
the fact that they are all merely intermediate. The chain of intermediate
ends in a technological society is extremely long, as anyone who has
ever spent much time toiling in a modern work cubicle knows. But in the
final analysis, they are (or should be) all classified on the level of means.
And while Heidegger undoubtedly is correct that the most secure and
comfortable path is to make something harmless and insignificant by
calling it self-evident, 8 respect for the capacity to think requires us to
conclude that the question where these intermediate ends ultimately lead,
as means, remains wide open. However rational we may be in pursuing a
"useful" education, a "good" job, and conventional "success," these
means do not necessarily bring us happiness or lead to the plausible
ultimate end of living a good life.
Max Weber's notorious "iron cage" 9 vividly represents the radical
difference between intermediate and ultimate ends in the conditions of a
technological society like ours. According to the most profound sense of
this image, the universal rational pursuit of intermediate ends in such a
society (sometimes called the "rat race") can construct a kind of prison
6. Cf MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in THE QUESTION
CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS 3, 35 (William Lovitt trans., 1977) (remarking that

"the essence of technology is nothing technological").
7. MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL

FRAGMENTS 69 (Gunzelin Schmid Noerr ed., Edmund Jephcott trans., 2002).
8. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS 19 1-3: ON THE ESSENCE AND ACTUALITY OF

FORCE 68 (Walter Brogan & Peter Wamek trans., 1995).
9. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 181 (Talcott Parsons
trans., 1958). We actually owe the phrase "iron cage" to Parsons, who used these words to translate
Weber's German expression, ein stahlhartes Gehause. The latter can also be translated as "a casing,
or housing, as hard as steel." See DEREK SAYER, CAPITALISM AND MODERNITY: AN EXCURSUS ON
MARX AND WEBER 144 (1991).
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in which the formulation and attainment of any rational ultimate end for
the individual becomes difficult or impossible. Perhaps this explains
why the couches of psychoanalysts in the West are full of people who
have worked very hard to have it all, outwardly speaking, but who
inwardly experience their lives as trivial and devoid of meaning. Even
retirement, which used to represent the dream of rest, recreation, and the
pursuit of personal fulfillment after a lifetime of toil, is under attack
from the standpoint of intermediate ends. Consider that a recent article in
a prominent magazine asks, rhetorically, "Why should people living
longer, healthier lives also feel they are automatically entitled to spend
less time working and ever more time in retirement?"'° 0-as if the
ultimate point of life is to live in order to work, rather than just the
opposite.
Weber's concept of the iron cage also reproaches the relation between
intermediate and ultimate ends when it is considered from the global
standpoint of humanity as a whole. According to a recent article on the
regrettable persistence of hunger in the world, the World Bank's chief
economist, Nicholas Stem, has pointed out that the average European
cow receives $2.50 in subsidies, while seventy-five percent of the people
in Africa get by on less than $2 in global development aid." l No
convincing account of some deep and irreconcilable conflict between
ultimate ends explains why Europe gives more money to cows than to
starving Africans, especially since it is well known that agricultural
subsidies in rich countries actually undercut the efficacy of development
12
aid to poor countries by depressing the price of food on world markets.
Of course, the pursuit of short-term self-interest by European farmers
and their lobbyists is understandable from the standpoint of their
intermediate end of maintaining a high standard of living. But a larger
perspective gives thought the warrant to ask how this state of affairs
could ever be seen as a plausible ultimate end for modem technology,
especially given the enormous unrealized productive power that today's
humans have at their command.
With all due respect to Martin Heidegger, who tended to disparage the

10. Economic Focus: Re-engineering Retirement, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 70.
11.

Barry Bearak, Why Famine Persists,THE N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 13, 2003, at 32, 36.

12. Id. ("These subsidies also depress commodity prices, undercutting the ability of developing
nations to compete in world markets and get their nations off the dole.").
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language of means and ends,1 3 the question of technology's ultimate end
is the right one to ask because it self-consciously appropriates the
terminology of technological thinking (the means-end relationship) in
order to question technology on its own terms. If there is something
about the essence of modem technology that has inflicted a wound on
humanity, then it alone is the sword that can heal that wound. For the
essence of modem technology is not something abstract and distant from
us--on the contrary, it is in us and around us in the form of our world. In
an operational and result-oriented world like ours, a fact is the projection
of a method for finding it, and a method is the projection of a human
purpose. 14 This double insight into the intimate relation between facts
and purposes, Is and Ought, gives critical reason the chance to
disentangle the terms of the relation, interrogate the mostly hidden
purposes of modem technology for their meaning, and yes, also assess
modem technology's ultimate rationality.
The questionability of technology's contribution to ultimate ends is an
ancient theme. In the Charmides,'5 one of his earliest dialogues, Plato
describes Socrates as expressing considerable doubt about the ultimate
end of technological progress. After discussing with Critias the meaning
of the kind of wisdom that knows where its own knowledge ends, and
hence where its ignorance begins, Socrates relates a troubling dream that
he had. The dream concems a society where everything is extremely
well ordered, technologically speaking. Unable to tell whether the dream
came through "the hom or the ivory gate"' 6 (that is, whether its content
was bad and false, or good and true) Socrates goes on to describe what
he dreamt:
The dream is this. Let us suppose that wisdom is such as we are
now defining, and that she has absolute sway over us. Then,
each action will be done according to the arts or sciences, and no
one professing to be a pilot when he is not, no physician or
general or anyone else pretending to know matters of which he
is ignorant, will deceive or elude us. Our health will be

13. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, HOLDERLIN'S HYMN "THE ISTER" 45 (William McNeill & Julia Davis
trans., 1996) ("The question as to whether modem technology is a means or an end is erroneous
already as a question, because it utterly fails to grasp the essence of modem technology.").
14. Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL REMARKS 200 (Rush Rhees ed., Raymond
Hargreaves & Roger White trans., 1975) ("Einstein: How a magnitude is measured is what it is.").
15. PLATO, Charmides, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 99 (Edith Hamilton &
Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
16. Id. at 119.
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improved; our safety at sea, and also in battle, will be assured;
our coats and shoes, and all other instruments and implements
will be skillfully made, because the workmen will be good and
true. Aye, and if you please, you may suppose that prophecy will
be a real knowledge of the future, and will be under the control
of wisdom, who will deter deceivers and set up the true prophets
in their place as the revealers of the future. Now I quite agree
that mankind, thus provided, would live and act according to
knowledge, for wisdom would watch and prevent ignorance
from intruding on us in our work. But whether by acting
according to knowledge we shall act well and be happy, my dear
Critias--this is a point which we have not yet been able to
determine.17
Here, at the beginning of Western philosophy, we witness a mind
troubled by the relation between technical efficiency and ultimate human
ends: a mind willing to question that relation.
Socrates knew that so long as we question something exclusively in
terms of what it immediately provides us in comfort or material wellbeing, we are thinking technologically, not philosophically.
Accordingly, the italicized words in the previous paragraph indicate that
Socrates was unsure how (or even whether) science and technology,
viewed as means, contribute to the ultimate end of living a good life. In
this kind of questioning he is not alone in the history of Western
philosophy. Consider the brilliant twentieth century philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein, who expressed his own doubts on the question rather more
succinctly: "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions
have been answered, the problems of life remain completely
untouched."18
If a Luddite is defined as someone who yearns to shatter the
instruments of technology so as to return society to a supposedly pretechnological Eden,1 9 then it must be said that neither Socrates nor
Wittgenstein were Luddites. They were thinkers trying to get beneath the
glitter of technological progress to reach what is primordial about it. In
17. Id.
18. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS,

6.52, at 73 (D.F. Pears &

B.F. McGuinness trans., 1974) (1921).
19. The Luddites were a group of British workers who rioted and destroyed textile machinery
between 1811 and 1816, on the belief that it would diminish employment. The term probably comes
from the name of a worker, Ned Ludd, who destroyed stocking frames in eighteenth century
England. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 774 (William Morris

ed., 1969).
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Socrates' case, the primordial is technology's apparent indifference (or
irrelevance) to what human beings ought to do with their lives, as
opposed to how they should do what they happen to have decided to do.
In Wittgenstein's case, the primordial is a function of science's
commitment to methodological rigor: the scientific need to predetermine
the realm of questions that can be sensibly put to the world also narrows
the range of permissible answers, thus ensuring that none of these
questions and answers will ever touch what he calls the ultimate "sense"
and "value" of the world.2 °
A question like "What is the end of technology?" thus needs to be
thought down to its roots before any decently thoughtful answer to it can
be attempted. Most of the time we tend to leap over what is simple and
original, and get hung up on the complicated and derivative. And so it is
with technology: we tend to leap immediately into seemingly intractable
political controversies like technological progress versus the threats that
it poses to our privacy, or the preconditions for inducing investment in
future technology versus the needs of the poor, in undeveloped and
developed regions alike, to enjoy the benefits of present technology.
These problems are admittedly pressing and difficult, but they stand no
chance of being solved, or even properly understood, so long as the
question that grounds them remains unasked. Preceding all questions
about particular aspects of technology (including the manifold that is
sometimes called "law and technology") is this one: What is technology?
As a grounding question, the question just asked does not merely seek
to uncover correct information about technology's instrumentalities and
support institutions. Before thinking about personal computers, cell
phones, global positioning satellites, and "smart" bombs--before
inquiring into the laws of patents, copyrights, trademarks, and unfair
competition, which institutionally serve modem technology's tendency
to colonize ever-greater spheres of social life by transforming its
instruments into saleable commodities--before any of this, thought
should endeavor to grasp technology's essence.

20. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 18, 6.41, at 71. When all possible scientific questions have been
answered, Wittgenstein contends, "there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer." Jd.
T 6.52, at 73. What is it that the absence of all questions answers? According to Wittgenstein, it
answers why language itself cannot solve the most important problems of life: "Is not this the
reason why those who have found after a long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to
them have then been unable to say what constituted that sense?" Id. 6.521, at 73.
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THE ESSENCE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY

The essence of modem technology is not what medieval philosophers
would have called technology's quidditas, or whatness. Hence, our
problem is not to define the word technology, for such a definition
would only give us the illusion of a secure and stable content,
21
corresponding to what Heidegger would call technology's "ontical
determination. Before an entity is defined as what it is (the ontical), there
always prevails an ontological presupposition, on the part of the definer,
of what constitutes the being of the entity. In other words, you have to
already know what kinds of things count as really existing, as well as the
manner of their existing, before you can go around noticing and
describing this or that particular existing thing. For example, a Platonist
mathematician will insist that the number 7c really exists on the number
line, whereas a philosopher of mathematics may insist that it does not
exist, except in the form of a rule that is useful in making certain human
calculations.2 2 Heidegger succinctly (if rather abstractly) describes this
insight as follows:
Whatever is discloses itself only on the grounds of a preliminary
(although not explicitly known), preconceptual understanding of
what and how such a being is. Every ontic interpretation
operates on the basis, at first and for the most part concealed, of
an ontology.2 3
The difference between what a thing is and how it is (or between a being
and the being of that being) invites reflection about the preunderstanding that thought always brings to the project of defining. In a
phrase, the ontological difference allows us to see that whatness
presupposes howness.
The manner of technology's existence is thus prior to, and more
primordial than, its essence in the ontical sense. The simple "whatness"
of a thing is the product of a conceptual system that is reified, as
Theodor Adomo puts it, "on the model of a functioning apparatus": such
a system congeals its object into something solid that exists in a time

21. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 31-35 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans.,
1962) (describing the "ontological difference" that we are elucidating in the text).
22. See Louis Wolcher, A Meditation on Wittgenstein'sLecture on Ethics, 9 LAW & CRITIQUE 3,
29-30 (1998).
23. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PATHMARKS 50 (William McNeill ed., 1998).
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that has also been solidified into a uniform series of present moments.24
However useful this process may be to the technological manipulation of
the object-world, it is fatal to critical thought about technology, for it
ignores the dimension of historical, lived time that must be accounted for
if technology's ultimate end is to come into view. The point is not that
"existence precedes essence," as Jean-Paul Sartre once said. 5 The point
is that a being's manner of existing is its essence, at least for our
purposes. Thus, "essence" in the context of the present investigation can
only name the manner in which technology comes to presence and
abides through time: essence in the active sense of"essencing."
Considered dynamically and historically as the ongoing creation of a
world in which humans must dwell, modem technology does not just
reveal new realms or aspects of beings and articulate how they may be
manipulated to our advantage. Such a point of view on technology
naively imagines that there exist pre-made humans, on the one hand, and
then, on the other hand, instruments of technology that human beings
simply use or forbear from using. Technical methods are never just
procedures for treating objects: they represent a decision, and a
presupposition, about what constitutes the very objectivity of the object
world.2 6 More important than any use or project, or than any particular
technical performance, the essence of modem technology is such that it
has radically transformed our relationship to the real. The essence of
modem technology is in a very important sense pre-technological, for it
co-determines the attitudes, thought processes, and behaviors of human
beings before they ever set out to use any of technology's instruments. It
is a form of "challenging," as Heidegger says: the essence of modem
technology "enframes" the world and 27challenges human beings to
assemble and order it in a particular way.
In his most important text on technology, Die Fragenach der Technik
("The Question Concerning Technology"), 28 Heidegger argues that the
essence of modem technology (in the sense just described) poses the

24. THEODOR ADORNO, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 149 (Christoph Godde ed., Edmund

Jephcott trans., 2000).
25. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Humanism ofExistentialism, in EXISTENTIALISM: BASIC WRITINGS 268,

270 (Charles Guignon & Derk Pereboom eds., 1995).
26. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, ZOLLIKON SEMINARS 128-29 (Medard Boss ed., Franz Mayr &
Richard Askay trans., 2001).
27. HEIDEGGER, supra note 6, at 19.
28. Id. at 3-35.
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greatest of dangers to humanity and the world.29 Most Cassandras of
modem technology utter warnings about the catastrophic potentialities of
its instruments: atomic weaponry, bioengineering, the clearcutting of
rain forests, and so forth.30 Contradicting this usual account of
technology's dangers, Heidegger says that the threat to humans "does
not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and
apparatus of technology." 31 He declines to stir up a "demonry of
technology, 32 by decrying the destructive power of its instruments.
Rather, he attempts to warn us that the real danger to human beings
comes from an essence of technology that takes the form of
technological thinking. The problem is not that human beings employ
the means of modern technology, but that they have surrendered their
critical reason to the mentality that has brought those means into being:
the mentality of Homofaber.
Technology in all ages is never merely a means, Heidegger says: it is
a way of revealing the real.3 3 Men and women do not just use modem
technology-they are also used by it. Working all day in front of a
computer screen, in a factory, or in a store selling things that people may
or may not need, the subject of technology comes home to sit,
transfixed, before a television set that constantly bombards its viewers
with carefully constructed advertising images, sound-bytes of "news"
and "commentary," and reality shows full of attractive young men and
women willing to humiliate themselves for cash. Like a sponge, the
subject of technology gradually soaks up what the system makes
available in the object-world by way of occupations, news, and
entertainment, and in the process undergoes a metamorphosis. Under
these conditions the subject "become[s] an object of its object" 34 as the
Chilean philosopher Rolando Gaete puts it, in a dialectical movement
that goes from subject to object-world and object-world back to subject.
Although modem social theory specifies that the subject-object dialectic

29. Id. at 26-28.

30. See, for example, Einstein's warning, in 1950, that the nuclear arms race makes the "fate of
humanity" hang in the balance "more truly now than at any known time." ALBERT EINSTEIN, IDEAS
AND OPINIONS 161 (1954).
31. HEIDEGGER, supra note 6, at 28.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Rolando Gaete, Technological Thinking and the Identity of Modern Law, in BULLETIN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 6 (No. 9, Feb. 1993).
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characterizes any and all human societies, 35 there is something uniquely
de-ratiocinating about this one. For this dialectic transforms the ancient
values of logic and critical reason into their modern doppelgangers:
logistics and calculation. A sort of technological philistinism takes hold,
according to which all knowledge and performances must be evaluated
exclusively by their immediate utility and their contribution to material
values.
The essence of modern technology sets upon nature and challenges it
to become a constant source of supply: a "standing reserve" (Bestand),
as Heidegger puts it. 36 In this state of affairs the realm of production
never stops: what is produced reenters technology immediately as the
means of further production. Production becomes production for its own
sake, with the result that we consume in order to produce, and live in
order to work. This mode of revealing the real is qualitatively different
from the ways of thinking that were associated with pre-modern modes
of technology. The essence of modern technology manifests what
Heidegger calls the "will to planetary ordering, 37 and it is unique in the
dimension of its relentlessness and its tendency to colonize everything
and everyone: it never rests. We feel the need to be rational and
productive from the cradle to the grave. Even when it is on vacation,
technological thinking is busy organizing the environment to extract the
maximum amount of "fun" in the available time, recording it all on a
digital camera for future moments of enjoyment in the carefully
managed free time that it constructs for itself in the interstices of the
workday.
From a Heideggerian perspective, today's world has become a
standing reserve because technological thinking allows nature to reveal
itself only in the form of what can be continuously computed and
counted on for present or future use by human beings. "[E]verything is
ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just
so that it may be on call for further ordering."3 8 The idea of
"enlightenment" in such conditions becomes the monstrous demand that
everything be explained in terms of grounds that are readily accessible to

35. See generally PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF

REALITY (1966) (understanding social phenomena on the basis of a three-part dialectic:
externalization, objectification, and internalization).
36. HEIDEGGER, supra note 6, at 17.

37. HEIDEGGER, supra note 13, at 48.
38. HEIDEGGER, supra note 6, at 17.
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procedures of domination and control. 39 Thus, technological thinking is
not just a reflection of the will to master things-it is also the
compulsion to master things on the basis of correct procedure: it leads
to what Slavoj Zi~ek calls "the all-pervasive predominance of
'instrumental Reason,' of the bureaucratization and instrumentalization
of our life-world. ' 4° The chaotic, surprising, and spontaneous in nature
and in human relations show themselves as suspicious and dangerous to
technological thinking: "problems" to be overcome by appropriate
administrative solutions.
One important solution is cooption: the process by which opposition
(especially artistic) to the prevailing form of life is absorbed and
rendered harmless by the system it indicts. Art at its best has always
performed a transcendent and oppositional function vis 6 vis the given
reality. However, the members of today's would-be avant garde are
barely able to get ahead of the curve before the curve, constantly on the
lookout for something new and exciting to incorporate and
commercialize, catches up to them and turns them into "celebrities" and
their projects into moneymakers. Marcuse refers to the example of socalled "revolutionary art" like Picasso's Guernica becoming fashionable
and classical--"a cherished museum piece.",41 One could also mention
the disgusting commercialization, in movies and on television, of Anne
Frank and the Holocaust, as well as the transformation of the clothing
and symbols of 1960s counter-culture into fashionable "retro" statements
that can be worn for fun to the office or to the next hippy theme party.
In a world where productivity and efficiency become the measures of
all things, artistic images and new ideas can (and do) pass almost
effortlessly into slick advertising, political spots, and other forms of selfpromotion: think of Gershwin's Rhapsody in Blue getting us in the right
mood to buy airline tickets, images drawn from George Orwell's 198442
being appropriated to launch a computer company, the aging former film
rebels Orson Welles and Dennis Hopper hawking wine and computer

39. Attributing the origin of this point of view on nature to Cartesianism, Richard Watson
characterizes its root premise as follows: "Since there is nothing spiritual or sacred in nature, the
entire value of the natural world resides in its utility for humankind." RICHARD WATSON, COGITO,
ERGO SUM: THE LIFE OF RENt DESCARTES 17 (2002).
40. SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE TICKLISH SUBJECT: THE ABSENT CENTRE OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 221

(1999) (mentioning this phenomenon in the context of resistance to it from both the left and the
right of the political spectrum).
41. MARCUSE, supranote 3, at 201.
42. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
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solutions for business on television, and ExxonMobil's "proud"
sponsorship of Masterpiece Theater on Public Television. Under such
conditions, artistic images of transcendence are invalidated by their
incorporation into the daily reality of production and consumption,43 and
the artist's "Great Refusal"44-the protest against that which is-is
transformed into a Great Affirmation of the latest (un)subversive
fashions, modes of transportation, computer games, alcoholic beverages,
and television programs. And lest art's insidious and latent affirmation
of the commercial world gets lost on the artists themselves, copyright
law is there to help them transform their simulacra of protest into
profitable exchange values.
Thanks to what Marcuse calls the "frightful science of human
' 5 technological thinking knows just what buttons to push in
relations,A
people, which instincts (primarily greed, sex, violence, and
sentimentality) to pander to and gratify in order to lead the consumer
docilely into the chute. This cynical practice of "repressive
desublimation '46 lets loose instincts that used to be strongly repressed by
traditional law and social conventions, only to reroute their profitable
satisfaction by business into a dialectic of stimulus and response that
binds the consumer ever closer to the system. As Marcuse notes, the
process of creating repressive needs bears a strong resemblance to
political totalitarianism: just as the latter attempts to coordinate all social
performances through political control, the technological kind of
totalitarianism coordinates social behavior through the manipulation of
needs and aspirations by vested interests.47 Think of $10,000 watches
that keep the same time as a $20 Timex; $1,000 designer handbags and
briefcases that hold the same amount of material as durable bags costing
a tenth as much; humungous SUVs that transport you with half the fuel
efficiency, and at twice the price, of smaller cars; and $2,000 "high end"
shoes that are harder on your feet than a good pair of cheap sneakers.
The scary mass consciousness of political totalitarianism finds its analog
in the ubiquitous and only slightly less scary "happy consciousness" of
technological totalitarianism. This is the carefully nurtured "belief that

43. See HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 70 (1964).
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44. Id. at 63.
45. MARCUSE, supra note 2, at 118.
46. Douglas Kellner, Introductionto MARCUSE, supranote 3, at 1, 11.
47. MARCUSE, supra note 43, at 3.
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the real is rational and that the system delivers the goods,, 48 which
makes it well-nigh impossible for the technological subject to break the
spell of the things that are by naming the things that are absent in his
life: 49 like a pacified struggle for existence, or freedom from the planned
obsolescence that keeps him working overtime to replace things that are
already outmoded almost the day they leave the store, or time to be free
instead of acting like the wage-slave of his expensive wristwatch.
Technological totalitarianism is linked to a radical transformation of
the meaning of leisure time. The good news is that more people than
ever have it; the bad news is what it has become. Traditionally
conceived as time full of freedom for the world, nature and culture for
those who were lucky enough to enjoy it, leisure time is now a
continuum of blank, vacant time that the workday produces as a sort of
by-product. The technological subject feels the need to fill this vacant
time by the acquisition and passive consumption of commodified units
of "entertainment" that someone is always happy to sell, thereby
enabling people to while away the time until the beginning of the next
workday. Even the great national parks become structured environments,
with well-marked paths and learning centers that are suitable for the
work-like task of "enjoying nature"--all under the supervision of a cadre
of park rangers whose job is to police them for the kinds of uses that the
system deems inappropriate. In the terminology of Michel Foucault,
technological thinking is making ever-larger swaths of nature into
"panopticons, 5 ° where increasingly refined procedures for monitoring
and knowing are creating ever-increasing opportunities for discipline
and artificial needs-creation in the service of the system. The end result
is a depressingly "comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic
unfreedom ' 5 1 that compensates individuals for the alienation they
experience during their work lives by giving them prefabricated and
carefully engineered opportunities for titillation in their vacant time. The
cost of this titillation is not just the capital and social labor necessary to
produce it, but also the hidden cost of needs manipulation by the system:
the technological subject must now work more hours, and incur more
debt, to be able to afford the most gargantuan SUV, the latest version of
the Xbox, and annual trips to the theme park, where history and reality
48. Id. at 84.
49. Id. at 68.
50. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 195-228 (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1979).
51. MARCUSE, supra note 43, at 1.
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are reduced to predigested and wholesome bites of "fun."
Marcuse's sober conclusion about the meaning of all this warrants
more than a little reflection: "Free choice among a wide variety of goods
and services does not signifyfreedom if these goods and services sustain
social controls over a life of toil andfear."52 Although the distinction
between what is needed and what is merely wanted has always been
historically determined, technological thinking does not make it easy for
the subjects of technology to draw their own informed conclusions about
the difference between true and false needs. If, with Marcuse, we define
false needs as those that "perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and
injustice, ''53 then critical thought requires a certain distance, or
dissociation, from what it strives to comprehend if it is to distinguish the
false from the true in the realm of needs. But distance from the given
reality is precisely what technological thinking tends to deny to its
subjects, with the result that individuals in prosperous countries
instinctively feel the need to work harder and harder to afford more and
more frou-frou. This is not greed, or at least it is not just greed. This is
sheer madness, especially when one stops to consider that the finite time
available to each individual is the irreplaceable and ever-dwindling font
of life itself, and that we live in a world in which
hundreds of millions
54
are not even getting their most vital needs met.
The essence of technology has not always shown itself in these ways.
The word technology comes from techni, which to the Greeks meant the
human art of revealing what is concealed.55 Techni is the knowledge that
belongs to the activity of poijsis, which means the production and
bringing-forth of something.56 As Heidegger notes, the word techni
never named the instruments and material apparatus of technology: it
always represented the human know-how to transform the beings of
nature (physis) into new forms. 57 Nature tends to conceal itself, said
Heraclitus, 58 and techni originally signified all modes of revealing what
nature hides. The homemaker, the artist, the craftsman, the politician,

52. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 5.
54. With Marcuse, we will define vital "needs" as "nourishment, clothing, lodging at the
attainable level of culture." Id.
55. HEIDEGGER, supranote 6, at 12-13.
56. Id. at 13.
57. See id. at 12-13.
58. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS 71 (T.M. Robinson trans., 1987) (Fragment 123).
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and the lawyer: each possesses its own particular kind of techni.59
Within all of its many spheres of operation, the Greeks thought that
human techni transformed nature as a whole into particular beings that
display their own proper order in the world of human needs and
aspirations. However, the ordering effected by the Greek techni
eventually came to rest, whereupon physis (nature) continued to reveal
and produce itself from out of itself (more on this later). Production
(poijsis), for the Greeks, was first and foremost nature's production of
itself, on the basis of which human beings could
then produce things by
60
techni.
production:
of
kind
different
a
means of
The case is otherwise with the standing reserve that modem
technology has made out of nature: nature's self-production is hidden,
while the earth shows itself in the form of a huge warehouse full of
"resources" that just lie there, waiting to be counted and then exploited,
or else saved for future use. While techni in the Greek sense possesses
the object of production only until it is finished, thereafter releasing it
into the realm of the non-technological, 61 modem technology never once
loosens its grip on the object-world. Here are some examples, which we
will place behind bullet-points so that the (odious) technological form
will mimic the content:
*
The soil becomes a standing-reserve of crops, minerals, and
energy to be administered by agribusiness and the energy industry.
One no longer runs one's fingers aimlessly or reverently through the
loamy soil-one monitors the dirt for its capacity to grow crops and
produce ore.
*
The rivers become sites for the construction of dams, and
flowing cisterns that are used for irrigating vast farmlands and filling
reservoirs in sprawling cities and suburbs. What is left over is
carefully husbanded so that salmon can find a place to breed for the
fishing and restaurant industries, and so that city people can go on
guided (and usually expensive) river-rafting tours.
*
The air becomes a standing-reserve of oxygen for industry, and
then breathable gas to be monitored for "air quality." No longer the

59. HEIDEGGER, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that techni is not just the art of the craftsman, but
also "the arts of the mind and the fine arts").
60. Id. at I0-13.
61. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, PLATO'S SOPHIST 29-30 (Richard Rojcewicz & Andrd Schuwer trans.,
1997).
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dome of heaven, the sky also becomes an indifferent medium through
which airplanes and rockets can fly.
*
The sea becomes a standing reserve of "marine resources" to be
harvested by the fishing and whaling industries, gawked at by
snorkeling tourists, and filmed for couch potatoes to watch in nature
programs on television. No longer Homer's mysterious and awesome
"blue girdler of the islands," 62 the ocean becomes a kind of stage set
through which vacation cruises sail, and in which suntanned tourists
sport and play when they are on vacation at the shore.
* The shrinking patches of primordial nature left to us become a
standing-reserve of potential "experiences" to be packaged and sold
as McNature by the leisure and tourist industries. Nature as a
consumer good thus tends to shove nature as a source of unbought
wonder off the shelf. Even conservation is sold as being "good for
business," further confirming nature's diminishment to the status of
an exchange value.
*
Life becomes a realm of "bio-diversity" to be divided up,
counted, and assessed for its possible contributions to human welfare.
The grand spectacle that is life no longer lives for itself-it lives in
order to be useful and productive. If they are lucky, "endangered
species" get allotted bio-cubicles in the form of a few hundred
protected acres; otherwise, they die out, or are whisked away to zoos
so their genotypes can be conserved for future propagation and
reinsertion into whatever little bits of their habitat remain.
*
Language is also radically transformed. First changing from
words that uncover beings into words that represent them, 63 language
then morphs from a technique of representation into a productive
instrument: a crisp, hip, quasi-mathematical language that efficiently
communicates operational commands and responses.64 Thought
follows speech's suit, honing closely to the immediately useful, and
steering away from anything that is even remotely contemplative,
speculative, or otherwise "useless." Meanwhile, the constant drone of
background music, in public and private places alike, seems to

62. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 161 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., 1992).

63. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 6, at 11-12 (comparing the Greek idea of truth as the uncovering
of beings (alitheia)with the modem concept of truth as the "correctness of an idea").
64. Cf WALTER BENJAMIN, Karl Kraus, in BENJAMIN, supra note 1, at 239, 242.
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confirm Adomo's thesis that modem mass music fills the silence that
spreads when speech is reduced to silence because of anxiety, work,
and undemanding docility.65
0 The complex web of human actions and reactions, instincts and
motives, becomes a standing-reserve of predigested factoids and
disaster news to be "spun" and exploited by politics, the media, and
mass advertising. Remember the panicky run on duct tape shortly
after the attacks of September 11, and the alleged (but as yet
unfound) "weapons of mass destruction" that played such a large role
in stirring up popular support for the second war against Iraq? Or
how about the phenomenon of worldwide terrorism being reduced to
evildoers who "hate our freedom," whose real motives and
grievances we cannot and should not try to understand, and who
deserve only to be exterminated in the glorified bug-hunt that hightech warfare aspires to become?
* The political realm is diminished to the chance the masses have
to select their masters every couple of years from a slate of
candidates whose campaigns are funded by vested interests, and who
invariably cut their cloth to the wind of opinion polls that collect
droplets of pre-manipulated "public opinion" like the atmosphere
collects moisture. Indeed, the machinery of politics virtually requires
that the form of political thought conform to a set configuration of
public opinion that can easily be made available on demand to prove
or disprove virtually anything about "what the people think": as if the
point of politics were to register knee-jerks instead of engaging
widespread public debate on difficult (and often tragic) choices.
*
Last, and most ominously, even men and women are
transformed into a standing reserve of "human resources," where
"[i]ndividual distinctions in the aptitude, insight and knowledge [of
workers] are transformed into different quanta of skill and training, to
be coordinated at any time within the common framework of
standardized performances." 66 These "human resources" are
managed, consumed, and discarded on the basis of what Marcuse
calls the "Performance Principle, 6 7 according to which "everyone
65. Theodor Adorno, On the Fetish-Characterin Music and the Regression of Listening, in THE
ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT SCHOOL READER 271 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1982).
66. MARCUSE, supra note 3, at 44.
67. MARCUSE, supra note 2, at 197.
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has to earn his living in alienating but socially necessary
performances, and one's reward, one's status in society will be
determined by this performance." 68 In a nutshell: the system tells you
to shape up or ship out. Faced with such a choice, it is little wonder
that so few people do anything other than shape up.
There are counter-tendencies, of course, within a world that has been
transformed into a standing reserve. Were this not so, it would be
impossible to account for the enduring popular appeal of Willy Loman's
argument to his boss, in Death of a Salesman,69 for why he should not be
peremptorily fired for lack of productivity after thirty-four years with the
firm: "You can't eat the orange and throw the peel away--a man is not a
piece of fruit!",70 (The argument did not succeed, by the way: Willy was
fired.) An embattled labor movement, environmentalism and its various
Green parties, the grassroots movement to "downsize" career
expectations and material possessions, organized opposition to the most
pernicious effects of global capitalism on the environment and on the
Third World's poor, the international human rights movement: these
represent some of the counter-tendencies. However, from the standpoint
of technological thinking, these counter-tendencies will never be more
than individual "preferences" to be managed and controlled through the
political process. The essential terms of the debate-cost-benefit
analysis, interest group politics, the language of "resources," "human
capital," and "tradeoffs"-are predetermined by the dominant discourse
and by the stranglehold that it exerts on the human imagination.
Although this discourse does not necessarily produce "bad results," it
does require thought and politics to imagine the world in purely
logistical terms. Logistics in its original sense is the science of
procuring, maintaining, and transporting military materiel on command.
But in today's world it has come to characterize the way instrumental
reason achieves "results" in a political and social environment that is
construed as a battlefield of conflicting interests. Logistical methods
marshal and disburse arguments, public opinion, and resources in pretty
much the same way a supply sergeant assembles and dispatches bullets
and C-rations.
Technological thinking is impossible to evade whether we affirm or
deny it. "There is no personal escape," writes Marcuse, "from the
68. Id.

69.

ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN (1949).

70. Id. at 82.
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apparatus which has mechanized and standardized the world."'" He
illustrates this point with a simple example that has lost none of its
chilling accuracy in the sixty-two years since it was written; indeed, if
anything, the example has gained in accuracy:
A man who travels by automobile to a distant place chooses his
route from the highway maps. Towns, lakes and mountains
appear as obstacles to be bypassed. The countryside is shaped
and organized by the highway: what one finds en route is a
byproduct or annex of the highway. Numerous signs and posters
tell the traveler what to do and think; they even request his
attention to the beauties of nature or the hallmarks of history.
Others have done the thinking for him, and perhaps for the
better. Convenient parking spaces have been constructed where
the broadest and most surprising view is open. Giant
advertisements tell him when to stop and find the pause that
refreshes. And all of this is indeed for his benefit, safety and
comfort; he receives what he wants. Business, technics, human
needs and nature are welded together into one rational and
expedient mechanism. He will fare best who follows its
directions, subordinating his spontaneity72 to the anonymous
wisdom which ordered everything for him.
Better choices, more choices, greater efficiency, a smooth and wellordered existence: how self-evidently desirable this all sounds to those in
thrall to technological thinking; yet how pernicious this all can become
for those who value spontaneity and freedom above conformity and
docility.
Not only is the man's behavior in Marcuse's example perfectly
"rational," but the dissolution of all rationality "into semi-spontaneous
reactions to prescribed mechanical norms" means that, from the
standpoint of technological thinking, only a crank would insist on73
freedom of action to make journeys in some other, less efficient, way.
The cold, wet blanket of conformity to the "correct" thing to do makes
any dissent that dares question its correctness from the standpoint of its
ultimate truth look like a symptom of mental illness, rather than the
expression of an alternative vision of what being rational means.
Nowhere is this kind of ascendancy of means over ends better

71. MARCUSE, supra note 3, at 46.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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illustrated than in the standard neo-conservative argument that free
markets are almost always superior to government planning and
regulation for the production and distribution of goods and services.
While this argument can be shown to be technically correct in a large
number of circumstances (although perhaps fewer than is claimed by
free market fundamentalists) the point is not which form of social
organization is "best." Since both markets and government planning fall
into the category of means, the word "best" in this context signifies a
criterion that focuses on the efficiency of the means of production and
distribution, rather than on their ultimate end. "Best" merely signifies
what Weber calls the most "objectively rational" means to reach some
"subjectively rational" end: an end that must be known in advance if the
means are to be rightly called either rational or objective. 74 But neoconservatism's brand of "economic liberalism" interprets the formal
liberty to enter into market relationships as an ultimate value regardless
of the actual ends being pursued.
The argument that the market rightly leaves the formulation of
ultimate ends to the individual rather than to the collectivity ignores the
fact that the institution of the market, as well as the multitude of
contingent laws that make it what it is at any given place and time, are
themselves collective (political) decisions. The laws of property, torts,
contracts, unfair competition, and so forth construct the market--they do
not merely respond to it from the outside. That little word "entitlement"
hides a secret that most free market ideologues would like to keep under
wraps: without entitlements, there can be no market in the modem sense
of the word, and without government defining and protecting them, there
can be no entitlements. Since entitlements are a form of stealth
government, this means that even so-called free market capitalism is
really socialism by another name. By intensively specifying the basic
rules of the game, and standing ready to back them up by force (law), the
collectivity thus becomes at least co-responsible for the range of choices
that emerge from it. If you would rather write poetry and live within an
unspoiled natural world, but feel compelled by economic and social
circumstances to get a job and an apartment in a grungy city, this
narrowing of your effective choices is no less a collective decision than
if it had been centrally planned. But more importantly, if we are right

74. For an excellent analysis of the distinction between subjective and objective rationality, see
ROGERS BRUBAKER, THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON THE SOCIAL AND MORAL
THOUGHT OF MAX WEBER 53-55 (1984).
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that technological thinking and the world it creates make the formulation
and assessment of ultimate ends extremely difficult for the individual,
then the economic liberal's argument comes down to saying that we
should always wait for the ultimate ends of individuals to emerge from
conditions that are aggressively hostile to them. This is roughly
analogous to Henry Ford's reputed remark about consumer choice in the
days of the Model-T: "you can have any color car you want, so long as
it's black."
The economic subject of early nineteenth century laissez-faire
capitalism lived in a world where one could dream of breaking through
the flotsam and jetsam of archaic laws, social conventions and popular
superstitions that impeded the journey to productivity and profits.
Moreover, the individualistic rationality of the industrial revolution "was
born as a critical and oppositional attitude that derived freedom of action
from the unrestricted liberty of thought and conscience., 75 Today,
however, the race for productivity and profits is taken for granted to
such a degree that the modem economic subject has difficulty imagining
any other way of life, no matter how miserable he is in this one. Going
far beyond Karl Marx's notion of alienation, 76 technological thinking
makes private power relations appear "not only as relationships between
objective things but also as the rule of rationality itself. '77 The prospect
of standing up to The Man, while never a safe thing to do in any era,
shows itself in our age to be the very height of irrationality. After all, if
The Man is "delivering the goods," who but a lunatic would want to
question his power? What is more, since just about everyone who works
is part of some bureaucracy, whether public or private, this means that
just about everyone has some degree of power over others in the
bureaucratic chain. In such an environment, one can imagine oneself as
both administered and administrator, with all the petty pleasures of
domination that the latter role makes available to offset the sting of
being dominated in the former role. The result of this "you dominate me,
and I'll dominate her" mentality is that the system as a whole tends
towards what Marcuse calls "technical self-administration." 78 This
nearly endless chain of domination-submission-domination would be
75. MARCUSE, supra note 3, at 60.
76. See KARL MARX, The Economic and PhilosophicalManuscripts of 1844, in KARL MARX: A

READER 35, 37 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) (alienation defined in terms of man's "loss of the object and
bondage to it").
77. MARCUSE, supra note 3, at 57-58.
78. Id. at 59.
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laughable were it not so damned pernicious.
The historical transformation of the individualistic rationality of the
nineteenth century into the technological rationality of the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries represents a profound shift in the
meaning of self-interest. 79 The radical autonomy of the nineteenth
century's pioneer, frontiersman, and swashbuckling entrepreneur has
been replaced by people's dependence on institutional expectations to be
fulfilled. No longer is proud autonomy an aspect of self-interest: on the
contrary, it becomes an obstacle to, and heteronomy becomes a
condition of, rational action.80 The one who goes his own way, who
marches to the beat of a different drummer, who dissents and is not a
"team player": such a one has never had an easy time of it. But from the
standpoint of technological thinking he is both more and less than just an
annoying eccentric: on the one hand, he is a troublemaker and a nuisance
to the smooth functioning of the apparatus, but on the other hand, he is
so easily ignored and marginalized that he hardly poses a threat at all.
The complainer and the naysayer may reject what Adorno calls the
"traditional thinking which pins things down and organizes them in
terms of rigid concepts," 81 but unlike Adomo they just fade away into
obscurity: they do not get the jobs, the company cars, or the bonus
checks. As a consequence, today's maxim of rational self-interest has
become, more than ever before: "You have to go along to get along."
While the pursuit of self-interest has always been conditioned by
prevailing social conditions, never before has the individual's
conception of himself and his choices been so standardized. If the
technological subject is fortunate enough to get a good (and this usually
means expensive) education, it is true that he or she can choose from a
large menu of careers. But the norms and expectations governing what it
means to act, to think, and to consume like, say, a lawyer, a doctor, or a
corporate executive are virtually the same everywhere. Today's law
students, for example, are right in fearing that their "true" selves are at
risk if they become successful corporate lawyers. Unlike the roughedged and non-standardized lawyering of Lincoln's day, the
expectations of the "successful lawyer" in today's world tend to
transform people into Lexus-driving, three-piece-suit-wearing, briefcase-

79. The terms "individualistic rationality" and "technological rationality" are Marcuse's. Id. at
44.
80. Id. at 50.
81. ADORNO, supra note 24, at 15.
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carrying caricatures, and legal performances into standardized moves in
an elaborate game. Whereas one would like to think that the true degree
of human freedom is not just determined by the range of pre-made
choices open to the individual (e.g., "casual Fridays" at the law firm),
but by the freedom to radically transform what is chosen, as well as by
the existence of a residual freedom to opt out of the system altogether.
But what one would like to think is not what the system trains us to
think: "The countless agencies of mass production and its culture
impress standardized behavior
on the individual as the only natural,
82
one.,
rational
and
decent,
In the nineteenth century, individuals could plausibly escape into
what Hannah Arendt calls "non-society strata" lying outside the
established order.83 In the days when "society" in principle referred to
only certain classes of the population, Arendt notes, a person could
identify with excluded groups like the proletariat, Jews, and even
homosexuals. 84 But today, she astutely observes, "[a] good part of the
despair of individuals under the conditions of mass society is due to the
fact that these avenues of escape are now closed because society has
incorporated all strata of the population., 85 In other words, most people
in advanced technological societies feel that they are part of the system:
they can succeed within the system, or they can fail and become
mediocrities. Beyond that, nothing else is even imaginable. The law
student who chooses to become a public-interest lawyer, for example,
stays within an overall system of lawyering that construes progress as
successfully manipulating the doctrinal apparatus. However noble this
kind of lawyering is when seen from a position that values lifting up the
oppressed, it leaves the essential structure of the legal machine intact.
The fact that virtually everyone comes to value legal means (primarily
the discourse of individual rights and duties) is all the system needs in
order to perpetuate itself.86 For the occasional vindication of the rights
of undocumented aliens and welfare recipients fits seamlessly into the
perpetual vindication of the rights of government and big business. The
82. HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 7, at 21.
83. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FuTuRE 200 (1968).

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Cf. Isaac Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the Relative Autonomy of
the Law, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 571 (1977) (noting that the valued form of legal rights, based on
equal citizenship, is far more important than particular legal results for maintaining the domination
and oppression of a class-based society).
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point of mentioning this is not to make the familiar Marxist argument
that rights are ideological, anti-radical, and bad.87 The point is that even
the legal "rebel" seems perversely fated to become part of the overall
system of technological thinking.
Economic liberalism's vaunted criterion of Pareto optimality 88 is only
efficiency in the pursuit of intermediate ends in any society where
people are forced to pursue exclusively intermediate ends in order to
survive. For in such a society, the vast majority of the population express
their "preferences" first and foremost in terms of what will get them
through to the next paycheck or the next mortgage payment. This
behavior is admittedly an objectively rational means to the end of
survival, but it is subjectively rational only if people's ultimate end in
life is merely to survive the struggle for existence, like a beast that dies
of old age. The criterion of a "Pareto-rational society" under such
conditions thus tends to sanctify the status quo, no matter how alienated
and threatened people actually feel. The result is the glorification of a
kind of non-bloody conflict in the marketplace and in the halls of
Congress that corresponds to Foucault's inversion of Clausewitz's
notorious proposition about war and policy: "politics is the continuation
of war by other means." 89 Conservative and mainstream social science
thus decide, explicitly or implicitly, that they are for conflict, and they
refuse to take seriously the possibility that the category "conflict" could
be replaced by a peace that is not merely juridical, but also social and
economic. 90 One is again left with the impression that the widespread
belief that efficient markets always make for the best of all possible
worlds represents yet another victory for technological thinking, and a
triumph of means over ends.
The effect of technological thinking's "pessimistic anthropology" 91 on
our perception of world-wide social inequality, poverty, disease, hunger,
and exclusion is predictable: these travesties show themselves as
87. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA FORUM 32, 3637 (1982) (noting that "people like Marx thought of [rights] as the quintessence of bourgeois false
consciousness").
88. The principle of Pareto optimality holds that "a configuration is efficient whenever it is
impossible to change it so as to make some persons (at least one) better off without at the same time
making other persons (at least one) worse off." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 67 (1971).
89. MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED" 15 (David Macey trans., 2003). Carl

von Clausewitz actually wrote (in translation): "War is a mere continuation of policy by other
means." Id. at 21 n.9.
90. See ADORNO, supranote 24, at 68.

91. ilrgen Habermas, Afterwordto MARCUSE, supra note 2, at 238.
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regrettable but inevitable facts of nature, rather than as humanly
avoidable consequences. The theory that, in a market society, social
protectionism and concrete measures aimed at helping the poor usually
wind up hurting them in the end is a powerful narcotic, as the thousands
of law students who have learned even a little bit of law-and-economics
during the past thirty years can confirm.92 Marx, in his day, called
religion the "opium of the people." 93 To paraphrase the great labor
radical Joe Hill, 94 by this Marx meant that religion's promise of pie in
the sky when you die takes people's minds off the fact that they have to
live on hay down below while they are alive. It would seem that the
resigned viewpoint that market-based instrumental reason aimed at
intermediate ends is the only viable course left to us has become the
opium of today's progressive intelligentsia, especially since the collapse
of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe demonstrated the
inherent weaknesses of planned economies. But historical communism's
planned economies were always just as oblivious to ultimate ends as
technological thinking in Western democracies. The point is not that
markets should be seen as the best (or the least bad) solution to
delivering the goods. The point is that the obsession with "delivering the
goods" has tragically eclipsed all other considerations in public
discourse about the relations among technology, nature, and life.
Julia Kristeva recently asked whether "life as an event and a source of
questioning [has] become outmoded because it has been secured,
standardized, and trivialized by technology." 95 But to ask this question is
to refute it: the point is, or should be, also to bring technology's ultimate
end into view, so that technological means can be assessed in terms of
their qualitative and quantitative progress towards that end. The essence
of modem technology, in the form of technological thinking, almost
guarantees that the question concerning technology's ultimate end is not
asked; it almost guarantees that technological means remain blind to any
end other than their own perpetuation. Despite these tendencies, thought

92. For a general analysis of the way law school trains students to accept invidious social
hierarchies of all sorts, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHY (1984).

93. Karl Marx, Towardthe Critique of Hegel's PhilosophyofRight, in KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 262,263 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959).

94. His song The Preacherand the Slave, in INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD, LITTLE RED
SONGBOOK 36 (19th ed. 1923), contains the following lines: "You will eat, bye and bye, / In that
glorious land above the sky; / Work and pray, live on hay, / You'll get pie in the sky when you die."
95. JULIA KRISTEVA, HANNAH ARENDT 45 (Ross Guberman trans., 2001).
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owes itself, and humanity, the task of discovering whether the intense
complexity of the means of modem technology may have covered over a
possibly intense simplicity of their ultimate end.
III.

MODERN TECHNOLOGY'S ULTIMATE END

Technology's ultimate end should not be confused with the
previously described effects of technological thinking.9 6 If, as we have
attempted to show, technological thinking lives in forgetfulness of
ultimate ends, this does not imply that technology has (or should have)
no ultimate end. And if technological thinking has the baleful
consequences that we have attributed to it, this does not mean that
technology's ultimate purpose is the dehumanization of men and women
and the transformation of nature into a warehouse, any more that the use
of a hammer as a murder weapon indicates that murder is (or should be)
the ultimate purpose of hammers.
The use of the word "should" in the previous paragraph indicates
something important that we have yet to make sufficiently clear:
Although it may seem that the effects of a social phenomenon are there
for all to see, neither its effects nor its ultimate purpose can come into
focus clearly without collapsing the formal distinction between is and
ought, fact and value, performance and aspiration. That this has been our
guiding thought from the outset is indicated by the proposition that was
put forward in the very first paragraph: What a thing is (fact), and what a
thing is for (value), comprise two aspects of the same theme. The insight
that thought always approaches a thing from a particular value-position
is what saves the endeavor to determine the purpose of a whole
institutional complex like modem technology from becoming what Lon
Fuller calls "naive teleology. 9 7 In a sense, all descriptions of what
is-"the facts"--are teleological, since they represent what the describer
thinks is important and meaningful about the situation.98 To paraphrase
the philosopher Franz Rosenzweig: although a fact is never identical to
its classification, it is nonetheless always being judged according to its
96. The first is what philosophy for centuries, following Aristotle, has called technology's own
causafinalis (final cause), while the second is the effect of technology seen as a causa efficiens
(efficient cause). See HEIDEGGER, supranote 6, at 6.
97. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 146 (1969). The book as a whole articulates and
defends Fuller's thesis that law is a "purposive activity" that cannot be understood merely as a fact.
See, e.g., id. at 95-151.
98. For an extended engagement with this idea and its implications for social research, see Louis
Wolcher, The Many Meanings of "Wherefore" in Legal History, 68 WASH. L. REV. 559 (1993).
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classification.
It follows that any description of, or meditation on, technological
thinking necessarily implies some level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with what it is, as compared to other possibilities for human existence.
Since history has given us modem technology, and has delivered us over
to its essence, in the form of technological thinking, our task here can
only be to comprehend and recognize these facts in terms of what we
think they mean for humanity. In articulating technology's meaning,
thought transcends the semiotics of the here-and-now: thought
transforms the self-perpetuating semiotics of description into genuine
critique. The concept of the ultimate end of technology that we have
been developing thus corresponds to Marcuse's trenchant observation, in
One-DimensionalMan, that "[i]n social theory, recognition of facts is
critique of facts."' 100
From the standpoint of the individual, an ultimate end is the idea of a
state or performance the consummation of which has value in itself--not
because it leads to some other end, but simply because it is. Kant, for
example, famously elevated the human being to the status of an ultimate
end in one of his most powerful expressions of the Categorical
Imperative: "Act so as to treat man, in your own person as well as in
that of anyone else, always as an end, never merely as a means."''1 To
put it in rhetorical terms, the statement of an ultimate end represents its
own justification. Since the whole of an individual's life is never a
project that is completed during his or her lifetime, the ultimate value of
a human life as a whole is more difficult for the individual to bring into
view. Nevertheless, most individuals would readily agree with Kant that
at least their own lives have ultimate value for them. Even in the midst
of the rat race that technological thinking has constructed, people do
occasionally manage to take time to wonder whether their life as a whole
is going anywhere meaningful. The case of individuals attempting to
grasp the ultimate value of something that transcends their here-and99. FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, UNDERSTANDING THE SICK AND THE HEALTHY: A VIEW OF WORLD,
MAN, AND GOD 50 (Nahum Glatzer trans., 1999) ("The act is not identical with its classification,
but it is judged according to its classification.").
100. MARCUSE, supra note 43, at 118.
101. IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical Foundationsof Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 154,
195 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1993). Walter Benjamin thought that Kant's categorical imperative had
not elevated humanity high enough: "One might, rather, doubt whether this famous demand does
not contain too little, that is, whether it is permissible to use, or allow to be used, oneself or another
in any respect as a means." WALTER BENJAMIN, Critique of Violence, in BENJAMIN, supranote l, at
277, 285 n.*.
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now, and that is also never before them in the form of a whole, gives us
a pattern, or precedent, for thinking about the ultimate end of
technology. For modem technology, like life itself, also transcends any
one individual's here-and-now. Hence, however difficult it may be to
accept the notion that something like technology could itself have an
ultimate end, that is precisely the claim this essay makes. We claim that
technology does indeed have an ultimate end, something that leads
nowhere else, and that constitutes its own justification.
Although death is the termination of life, the ultimate end of life is not
death. The "ultimate" in the context of the present investigation is never
merely the last, but also always the first. It is the origin of all
comportment, of all that is intermediate. Just as the farthest point at the
commencement of a round trip journey is always the beginning, so too
the ultimate, as origin, is that to which everything secondary eventually
returns. Although the individual may desire much, including happiness,
there is something that is more original than any happiness, something
that puts happiness into question as one of many possible goals. The
origin, the ultimate "wherefore," of all human doing is never this or that
condition or state of affairs, for no condition or state of affairs ever
abides long enough to be ultimate.
Just as the human being as such cannot rightly be reduced to the
merely biological life with which it coincides, so too the ultimate end of
technology, as a manifestation of human being-in-the-world, does not
coincide with this or that project or performance. If, for heuristic
purposes, we follow the Western metaphysical tradition and say that the
human being is an embodied soul, this gives us a clue for what we are
seeking. We must attempt to identify the "soul" of technology that is
embodied in all the countless things that humans do with its instruments.
In short, the criterion of such a thing must be its propensity to abide
throughout countless performances, in much the same way that the soul
is said to abide through the many changes (including deteriorations) that
occur in the aging human body. There is only one thing that abides in
this way as long as human life lives, and in its constant abiding it is both
the origin and the return of all that is properly human: freedom. Let us
then say it plainly: The ultimate end of technology is a particularkind of
freedom.
A word or two on method: we have both "found" freedom in our
meditation on the ultimate end of technology and laid freedom down as
an axiom for the assessment and further development of technology. It
bears repeating that in social criticism the relation between Is and Ought
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is always dialectical. Those who wish to "prove" freedom's
impossibility do not escape it: they merely lay it down in a negated form
(unfreedom) as the axiom of their lives. They freely choose to bend their
necks to the yoke of technological thinking. We choose otherwise. For
us, "freedom" names the possibility of decisively breaking with
technological thinking-the possibility of changing history, for better or
worse.
If we define technology as such to be technical means in the service
of an ultimate end, then we are forced to conclude that the previously
described essence of modem technology is at war with freedom as its
ultimate end-at war with that of which it is the essence! In this curious
state of affairs, it is as if the essence of the human being-animal
rationale ("rational animal"), as traditionally determined-were
subverting the very purpose and meaning of human life: as if man had
finally succeeded in outsmarting himself. For the essence of modem
technology, as technological thinking, has no ultimate end. In this
dimension its rationality is fundamentally irrational, at least if one takes
the viewpoint that the purpose of society as
a whole is to preserve and
10 2
unfetter the people of which it is composed.
Like all things human, the essence of modem technology makes a
world-an odious world, perhaps, but a world nonetheless. In a world in
thrall to technological thinking, freedom's mode of abiding consists for
the most part in its withdrawal and quiescence. A manifestation of
human being-in-the-world, technological thinking stands in the sharpest
possible contrast to what we will now call freedom for responsibility.
The latter is also a manifestation of human being-in-the-world, but
unlike technological thinking it maintains a certain critical distance
between itself and its world. In it, freedom awakes. Technological
thinking falls into its world wholeheartedly, becoming its world to such
a degree that it is incapable of imagining any other possibility of
existence. In a manner that will become clear later, however, freedom
for responsibility always remains on the hither side of its world in the
form of freedom's possibilities and freedom's responsibility. Modem
technology, in the sense of technics, has been "captured" by
technological thinking to such a degree that the latter has driven the
ultimate end of technology as such into darkness and obscurity. It is high
time for freedom to rediscover that end-namely, itself-and in so doing
to transform modem technology's essence, its mode of being.
102. See ADORNO, supranote 24, at 133.
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We will attempt to show in the next section that there can be only one
ultimate end for technology that is worthy of the name: freedom to take
responsibility for what humans-and-nature are becoming together. But it
is clear that the ultimate effect of technological thinking in present
circumstances is precisely the opposite. Marcuse is right in saying that,
for the most part, in modern technological societies "the individual's
performance is motivated, guided and measured by standards external to
him, standards pertaining to predetermined tasks and functions," and that
"his liberty is confined to the selection of the most adequate means for
reaching a goal which he did not set."' 0 3 As this passage suggests,
freedom should never be confused with liberty. If license is the power to
satisfy instinctual drives whenever external constraints are absent,
liberty is merely the unimpeded power to follow your motives around,
like a dog follows its master. But freedom for responsibility has nothing
to do with choosing this or that good from a set of goods that has been
extracted, usually by someone else, from the standing-reserve that nature
and human relations have become. Rather, genuine freedom is openness
to destiny--openness to being claimed by something: an aphorism that
must remain obscure so long as freedom itself is not thought down to its
roots.
IV. THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM
The phenomenon of freedom shows itself in what the West for two
thousand years has called "nature." Since we are beings-in-nature, the
word "nature" necessarily represents the conceptual context in which
freedom must be understood, if it is to be understood at all. Thought
about human freedom will always remain superficial if it fails to think
down to freedom's ground, which is nature itself. For a long time the
idea that man is part of nature has been held captive by a criterion that
holds nature to be an intermediate end: nature has been seen merely as
the direct means of life and the material object of human activity.0 4 This
captivity must be broken if freedom is to be understood in a manner that
is sufficiently radical. Hence freedom's grounding question-what is
nature?--must be asked in a way that does not treat the answer as selfevident.
Fortunately, a nearly forgotten tradition gives us the means to ask this
103. MARCUSE, supra note 3, at 45.
104. See, e.g., KARL MARX, Economic and PoliticalManuscripts, in EARLY WRITINGS 63, 126
(T.B. Bottomore trans., 1964).
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grounding question. In Western thought, before there ever was a
"nature" there was physis. This Greek word is the root of our words
"physics" and "physical." Roman thinkers later translated physis into
natura, the antecedent of our words "nature" and "natal." The translation
has been decisive ever since: the image of the natal (Mother Nature
giving birth to the world's many beings) supplanted an altogether
different image of self-generation and self-renewal. Lost in the
translation was an entire way of thinking about nature. Physis was not
originally a realm of natural (as opposed to man-made) objects
interacting with one another in processes that occupy space and time in a
determinate way. Rather, physis was conceived as the origin of a kind of
unfolding that proceeds, as it were, from out of itself, and that manifests
itself in the persistence in being of all that is: a concept that undoubtedly
reflects what Werner Jaeger calls the Greeks' "organic point of view."10 5
Moreover, natura was destined to become a theological concept in the
Middle Ages (as in "God created nature"), whereas the concept ofphysis
transcends theology: the Greeks thought that the gods themselves, just
like everything else in10 the
world, were manifestations of physis, and not
6
around.
way
the other
This rather odd notion of self-generation contradicts our deeply
accustomed way of thinking about nature, at least in modernity, as a
realm (natura) of created beings that rattle around in space and pass
through time. Physis names presencing as the manner in which beings
persist in being. Although physis itself is radically simple and obvious, it
is hard for modern humans to grasp as a concept, thanks to the ubiquity
of technological thinking. Physis eludes the common sense of
technological thinking precisely because it is a condition of common
sense: the eye that sees does not, after all, see itself seeing.
Consequently, just as there are color-blind people, so too there will be
people who are blind to physis.' 07 Nevertheless, we will forge ahead with
full confidence in the truth of Spinoza's epigram: "For all that is

105. WERNER JAEGER, I PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE, at xx (Gilbert Highet trans.,

1945).
106. See Heidegger's classification of the three stages of Western thought on the being of beings:
"[A being] in its emergence unto itself (Classical Greece); [a being] caused by a supreme [being] of
the same essence (Middle Ages); [a being as] the extant as object (modernity)." MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY (FROM ENOWNING) 120 (Parvis Emad & Kenneth

Maly trans., 1999).
107. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 23, at 202.
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excellent and eminent is as difficult as it is rare."' 0 8 When the preSocratic philosopher Heraclitus said that "the sun is not only new each
day, but forever continuously new,"10 9 he meant to draw attention to
something very uncanny about existence. Foreshadowing Einstein's
general theory of relativity by two-and-a-half millennia, Heraclitus knew
that the present moment and all of the beings that are present in it
(ourselves included) are not like a uniformly aging box full of its
contents; he saw that they belong together in an inseparable and dynamic
jumble made up of both space and time. From the standpoint of physis,
life and world are never two things standing side by side. Rather, life
plus world equals history: not history in the dry sense of something that
is past, but history in the active sense of the ongoing making of history
in the here-and-now.
If natura's best metaphor is that of birth, then perhaps the most
appropriate metaphor for physis is that of bud and flower. ° The
"fecundity of nature" (natura)thus stands opposed to a nature that is like
a rose bud unfolding itself into a blossom (physis). The true salience of
this difference is not to be found in the observation that naturaconnotes
the female, and physis the male, but in the insight that the image of
fecundity represents a kind of splitting in two, whereas that of blooming
represents the persistence in being of a unity. Moreover, the law of cause
and effect governs natura, while in physis there is something about
nature that precedes all talk of causation: for the ancients, physis is that
which is always already here. If naturagives us the idea of the real (real
beings, real events), then physis gives us the idea of reality as a whole,
which is a lot "bigger" phenomenon than even the biggest real thing.
Reality as a whole manages to persist without its persistence being
caused by any particularreal being or event. Although science can hope
to explain the behavior of all that is real, it has and can have nothing to
say about the mind-boggling peculiarity that there is a reality in the first
place.
Continuing with the metaphor of blooming, the indifference of physis
to causation is like that of the rose in this remarkable couplet from The
Cherubic Wanderer, a book of poetry written by Angelus Silesius in the
sixteenth century:
108. "Nam omnia praeclara lam difficilia quam rara sun," quoted in ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER,
1 THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRESENTATION 384 (E.F.J. Payne trans., 1958).
109. HERACLITUS, supra note 58, at 13 (Fragment 6).
110. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS 14 (Ralph Manheim trans.,

1959).
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The rose is without why: it blooms because it blooms,
It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen.
To be "without why" is not an occult or mysterious state; it means, first
and foremost, to persist in being before becoming a mere object for
human contemplation or manipulation. Spinoza had a term for this
11 2
extraordinary tendency of beings to persist in being: conatus essendi.
Think of this conatus essendi as such and in its own right, and the idea
of physis can begin to emerge from the mists of metaphysics into the
sunlight of the here-and-now. In any case: for the Greeks, nature as
physis must first persist in being before nature as natura can exhibit its
dazzling array of causal relations to the inquisitive human mind.
In nature conceived as natura human beings stand above, and
ultimately against, non-human beings in the form of nature's creatures.
In physis, however, the emerging, flourishing, and decaying of all beings
(human and non-human) are constantly manifesting nature. They are
nature, in fact. In natura humans are the first and best of Mother
'
Nature's creatures, the "summum bonum ...of creation."113
In physis
humans share with all beings a non-natal origin that Heraclitus described
as an ever-living fire, itself without origin, that is constantly being
kindled in measures and being put out in measures. 14 Nature gives us
the idea that we are different from it; physis gives us the idea that we are
it. Something is "unnatural" if it does not fall into place in the world
conceived as a collection of beings governed by "natural" laws. But the
negation of the word physis does not describe anything unnatural in this
sense. From a Greek point of view, physis is not so much the antithesis
of nomos (lawfulness): rather, physis makes nomos possible by being
here in the first place, so that beings can then be observed, by humans, to
behave or violate natural or man-made laws.
Modern science and technology are completely, if not obsessively,
grounded in the idea of nature as natura.Science is the development of a
certain way of looking at things: a way that the Greeks originally called
theoria. However, theoretical knowledge for the Greeks (sophia) was
11.The poem is quoted, and information about the poet is provided, in MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
THE PRINCIPLE OF REASON 35 (Reginald Lilly trans., 1991) (1957).
112. BENEDICT [BARUCH] DE SPINOZA, ETHICS 135 (W. Hale White trans., 1930). For Spinoza's
original Latin terminology, see EMMANUEL LEVINAS, ALTERITY AND TRANSCENDENCE 166
(Michael B. Smith trans., 1999).
113. Martin Heidegger, The Problem of Sin in Luther (1924), in MARTIN HEIDEGGER,
SUPPLEMENTS 105, 105 (John van Buren ed. & trans., 2002).
114. HERACLITUS, supra note 58, at 25 (Fragment 30).
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sharply distinguished from the knowledge that is appropriate to techni.
The latter kind of knowledge, which they called phronesis, is for the
sake of production only, whereas sophia lies beyond the sphere of mere
utility in the form of seeing and knowing for its own sake. 15 Things are
otherwise with technological thinking in our era, which demands
scientific results (and pays for them, by way of research funding) that
can be transformed into a standing reserve of useful things and
procedures. In conducting modem science and technology, we are not
ourselves: we ask questions the way "everyone" asks them, and we
conduct research the way everyone else does.' 16 From the standpoint of
technological thinking, the proud motto of pure science that is carved in
the tombstone of the great mathematician David Hilbert---"Wir miissen
wissen. Wir werden wissen." ("We must know. We will
know.")' '7 -leads naturally and inexorably to another, more sinister,
motto: "We must control and administer what we know. We will control
and administer it." The scientific conquest
of nature thus slides easily
' 18
man."
of
conquest
"scientific
into the
A natura that is fully known implies the entry of all natura'sbeings
into spheres of domination and control." 9 This is not so from the
standpoint of physis, where things are never first of all objects of
theoretical contemplation or political and economic manipulation; in
emerging with us into the world, beings are always already here for our
dealings with them. As modes of knowing, science and technology
accomplish something other than themselves, whereas physis always
accomplishes just itself. And although scientific theory in service to
technological thinking would like to convince us otherwise, it is only
one of the many possible (and valid) ways that we can choose to view
and speak about nature in the sense ofphysis.
Take the example of images produced by the human mind. The
psychoanalyst approaches human images scientifically, as symptoms of
a cause. Freud's pedantic reduction of the mystic's "oceanic feeling" to

115. HEIDEGGER, supra note 61, at 84.

116. Martin Heidegger, Wilhelm Dilthey's Research and the Strugglefor a Historical Worldview,
in HEIDEGGER, supra note 113, at 147, 164.
117. See Riemann's Riddle, THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 74, 75.

118. MARCUSE, supra note 43, at xiv.
119. Cf HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 7, at 95 ("Technical rationality today is the
rationality of domination.").
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120
certain experiences and feelings in infancy is a good example of this.
The psychoanalyst and psychologist seek to explain things, and hence
they understandably abandon "ontological investigation of the image, to
dig into the past of man," as Gaston Bachelard puts it. 2 1 In doing so,
however, they more or less inadvertently "explain the flower by the
fertilizer,"'' 22 for the image itself then loses all meaning apart from its
place in the causal nexus. In Heideggerian terms, the sciences of the
human mind are characterized by a "forehaving" that interprets being as
a series of causes and effects, and by a "foreconception" that addresses
and speaks about mental life only in terms of this series.' 23 Both the
forehaving and the foreconception are firmly locked into various
academic "disciplines" that suffocate all other kinds of questioning. But
of course there are, nevertheless, many other possible ways of looking at
images. The phenomenologist, for example, aspires to "take the image in
its being"'124 by merely describing what is seen, rather than explaining or
analyzing it. 125 And there are at least some artists, poets, and aesthetes
who are content to make or contemplate the image as such, 126 all the
while remaining indifferent to its proper place in the causal nexus, and
sometimes even to its potential to turn a profit. In the present age,
however, these and other non-technological ways of looking at things
remain as but small islands within a vast sea of technological thinking.
For humans everywhere are submerged in a technological anthropology
that already knows what
man is, and hence can never ask the question of
127
whom he might be.
In nature as natura human needs and wants, including the scientific
desire to know, are set against a nature that is an adversary to be
conquered and tamed. To name nature's children, to unlock her secrets,
to marshal her wealth and resources, to master her processes and make

120. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 11-20 (James Strachey ed. & trans,

1962)(1961).
121. GASTON BACHELARD, THE POETICS OF SPACE. at xxvi (Maria Jolas trans., 1969).

122. Id.
123. Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle, in
HEIDEGGER, supra note 113, at 111, 121.

124. BACHELARD, supranote 121, at xxv.
125. See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION, at viii (Colin Smith trans.,
1962).
126. Cf Wallace Stevens, The Irrational Element in Poetry, in WALLACE STEVENS, COLLECTED
POETRY AND PROSE 781-92 (1997).

127. Martin Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture, in HEIDEGGER, supra note 6, at 115, 153.
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them do the bidding of humans: this is the essence of our attitude
towards nature conceived as natura. The concealment of nature as
naturachallenges humans to pry it open and discover its secrets like the
oysterman pries an oyster open to find the pearl within. In contrast, the
concealment of nature as physis is a great mystery and paradox: it is
Heraclitus's "ever-living fire," that keeps on going and going in a way
that would put the Energizer Bunny to shame. If natura reports itself
only in a form that can be ordered within a system of "information,"
physis refrains from reporting itself at all: it simply endures. If, in
natura,truth is the "correct" correspondence between a proposition and
the facts, in physis the truth of presencing shows itself long before any
proposition is uttered, or fact determined.
Although our previous survey of the effects of technological thinking
may sound pretty grim, to loosen natura's grip on our minds and to
begin thinking of nature in terms ofphysis does not have to transform us
into Luddites or revolutionaries. No reasonable person could doubt that
human beings need natural resources in order to live and prosper. Nature
in this sense is the irreplaceable source of all our food, clothing, shelter,
medicine, and art. However cruelly and unequally distributed they are at
the present time, scientific discoveries, the fruits of modem technology,
and technological planning are obviously essential means for
maintaining and enhancing conditions of life on this planet. It is not the
technological base that presents the problem: it is the superstructure of
technological thinking that we must break with. Like Rousseau, 128 we do
not urge humanity as a whole to renounce technology's advances in
order to avoid the vices of technological thinking. For it is not a question
of either/or here. The most pressing question for humanity is whether we
also need, or even are able to recognize, nature in the sense of physis.
Treating nature as natura enables life to live. But treating it (including
ourselves) as physis can begin to make life worth living.
Let's be blunt: the life of a puppet--even a healthy and well-outfitted
puppet-is a degraded way of living. In physis, however, lives a
spontaneity that puppets cannot know. Physis alone implies the idea of
freedom: it reflects the image of ourselves as the uncausedorigin of our
future. Freedom and responsibility are impossible to imagine if we
conceive of nature as a box containing entities (including ourselves) that
obey immutable laws. Thus, the ancient debate between those who think
128. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES 31, 124 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1993).
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we have free will and those who think that all of our actions are
predetermined keeps on sputtering inside a concept of nature whose
essential ambiguity has never been worked out.
As Schopenhauer demonstrates, in a nature conceived as naturathere
is no genuine choice, only its illusion: although there exist motives that
can cause actions, the motives themselves exist only if they have been
caused by something else. 129 This is why freedom cannot properly be
130
classified as the phenomenon of an autonomous and reasonable will,

for in freedom of choice (liberum arbitrium) the will is always held
hostage to a prior judgment between two or more given things according
to a predetermined motive which, as Arendt puts it, "has only to be
argued to start its operation."' 13 1 Nevertheless, in the Western
metaphysical tradition freedom is usually classified as a kind of
uncaused causality; there is causality in accordance with the laws of
nature, and then there is "another causality through freedom," as Kant
describes it in the Third Antinomy. 32 Although this way of thinking
about freedom gives us the image of what Kant calls "an absolute causal
spontaneity beginning from itself,"'' 3 this account of a cause-and-effect
relation between freedom and its output logically resembles a squared
circle, and is a far cry from the concept of freedom that we are
attempting to show here, on the basis of the idea ofphysis.
The genuine freedom of which we speak is not properly classified as a
kind of causality: on the contrary, as Heidegger puts it, the real relation
is vice versa: "causality is a problem of freedom."' 134 This is because
causality is the fundamental category of beings conceived ontically as
objects that are simply present, and that then change or perish according
to natural laws. Whereas freedom in our sense is a self-blossoming
origin of a human world that only then passes into the category of
causation. An origin in the Greek sense (archi)is not a cause. 1 It is not
129. SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 108, at 106-09; see also ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, PRIZE
ESSAY ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL 40-42 (Eric Payne trans., 1999).

130. Schopenhauer pessimistically made the illusion of freedom, including the feeling that we
choose our motives, into the phenomenon of a will that is essentially a blind form of striving,
without any ultimate aim. SCHOPENHAUER, supra note 108, at 308.

131. ARENDT, supranote83, at 151.
132. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 484 (Paul Guyer & Allen Wood eds. &

trans., 1998).
133. Id.
134. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN FREEDOM 203 (Ted Sadler trans., 2002)

(1982).
135. HEIDEGGER, supranote 8, at 85.
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a thing from which some other thing proceeds, but is rather a kind of
proceeding in which the origin is constantly passing into the originated.
Although Kant himself glimpsed something like this order of priority in
classifying causation as one of the categories of our understanding,
rather than as a property of things in themselves, 136 he failed to see that
137
causality is grounded in freedom, and not the other way around.
Freedom stands on the hither side of the actual in the form of
possibilities. Since the past has already devoured its possibilities, the
possibilities of which we speak should not be conceived as being
outlined beforehand, as if freedom were limited to bringing about one of
them. Rather, we must succeed, as Bergson says, in conceiving of
freedom's possibilities in terms of the "radically new and
unforeseeable."' 31 Only if we understand freedom in this sense can we
break decisively with the view that the present state of affairs in
technology is inevitable.
Politics traditionally cares about freedom in its "outer" dimension
only. Its context is the decision whether and how to restrain the
individual's freedom of action (negative freedom), or to endow the
individual with certain freedom-enhancing entitlements (positive
freedom). Standing in contrast to these kinds of outer freedom is the
139
traditional metaphysical concept of what Kant calls "inner freedom.'
Just as the feeling of inner freedom can be absent despite the removal of
all external restraints, so too the inward experience of freedom that the
Stoics celebrated 140 can show itself despite all outer manifestations of
freedom's absence. As Arendt correctly says, however, this traditional
conception of inner freedom presupposes "a retreat from the world,
where freedom was denied, into an inwardness to which no other has
access." 14 1 Inner freedom thus conceived is a lonely and ineffectual
thing. In contrast, our notion of genuine freedom, freedom for
responsibility, radically inverts the traditional understanding of these
"inner" and "outer" dimensions of freedom. The shape and condition of
the public world is now felt to be inner freedom's burden and
responsibility, while a formerly calm inner freedom feels the need to
136. KANT, supra note 132, at 262-64.
137. HEIDEGGER, supra note 134, at 205.
138. HENRI BERGSON, THE CREATIVE MIND 18 (Mabelle L. Andison trans., 1946).
139. IMMANUEL KANT, Critique of PracticalReason, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 137, 268 (Mary

J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996).
140. See, e.g., EPICTETUS, A MANUAL FOR LIVING 3-5 (Sharon Lebell trans., 1994).
141. ARENDT, supra note 83, at 146.
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pass from its refuge into the outer world of politics. Freedom for
responsibility intervenes, and having intervened, it feels a tinge of guilt
no matter what the outcome is. This is not a paradox but an existential
imperative for anyone who takes the idea of responsibility seriously.
The traditional Western definition of liberty as freedom from politics
(political freedom) enshrines the private sphere as the site where
freedom transpires. 142 And the solemn guarantee (if not the actual
achievement) of fundamental human rights, including the right to
privacy, is undoubtedly a genuine advance over tyranny and
totalitarianism. But it must be noted that freedom for responsibility is
never something that ends in the private sphere, beyond the reach of
politics. On the contrary, it begins there as the individual's recognition
that the terms "private" and "public" are inadequate categories for
grasping the nature and the scope of the responsibility for the world that
freedom makes.
True freedom is experienced only in acting, not in willing; it is not
experienced as sovereignty over something or someone, but as a
spontaneous participation in destiny. Freedom thus conceived is not
obedience to Kant's "moral law within,"'' 43 for this kind of freedom
limits responsibility to compliance with the moral law. It lets you off the
hook if you think you have done "the right thing." Whereas, if each
moment is full of possibilities for freedom that the next moment
eclipses, this means that we are destined to live a life suffused with
responsibility for all of the roads not taken. Freedom's movement is thus
tragic, for as the philosopher Emmanuel Levinas remarks: "The tragic
does not come from a conflict between freedom and destiny, but from
the turning of freedom into destiny, from responsibility.' 44 Life lived in
the consciousness of the tragic in this sense is always an occasion for
guilt; in fact, freedom and guilt entail one another. In one of his earliest
texts, Heidegger helpfully elucidates this point in terms of the
phenomenon of conscience, which so often refuses to be soothed by
reason's whisper, "I did the right thing":
To choose one's conscience means at the same time, however, to
become guilty. As Goethe once said, "He who acts is always
without conscience, irresponsible." Every action is at the same
time something marked by guilt. For the possibilities of action

142. Id. at 149.
143. KANT, supra note 139, at 269.
144. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, EXISTENCE AND EXISTENTS 79 (Alphonso Lingis trans., 2001).
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are limited in comparison with the demands of conscience, so
that every action that is successfully carried out produces
conflicts. To choose self-responsibility, then, is to become guilty
in an absolute sense. Insofar
45 as I am at all, I become guilty
whenever I act in any sense.
In the terminology of Max Weber, to be free is be aware of the
ultimate meaning of human conduct, and this means to live in the
"knowledge of tragedy with which all action, but especially political
action, is truly interwoven.' ', 46 Unfortunately, the hackneyed old sports
saying, "No pain, no gain," is also an accurate description of all
historical change for the better. Only what Benjamin calls a "quite
childish anarchism" could refuse to acknowledge any constraint on the
individual; only such a one could fail to see that the very meaning of
morality and history becomes impossible to think if action, including the
violence of radical change, is removed from the sphere of thought and
politics. 47 Conversely, only an ideologue utterly and blindly convinced
of the rightness of his cause could fail to see the pain and disruption that
his effective and even "reasonable" actions cause. As Levinas puts it:
"There are cruelties which are terrible because they proceed from the
necessity of the reasonable Order. There are, if you like, the tears that a
civil servant cannot see."' 148 Freedom for responsibility is thus a way of
living that is radically different from mindlessly falling into the everyday
world of production and consumption, where everyone does pretty much
what everyone else expects them to do, and nature becomes a mere
assembly of objects for us to use and abuse, conserve and consume,
honor and dishonor, all according to the preferences that technological
thinking allows and encourages us to form. To transcend this world
requires both the courageous action of a hero and the humility and
sorrow of a saint.
Although we obviously need nature's resources, we do not need
technological instruments as such nearly as much as we need freedom
for responsibility. While the attempt to fly from freedom may quench the
fires of responsibility and guilt, at least for a while, such an attempt is
none other than a cowardly acquiescence in the status quo. As long as
145. Heidegger, supra note 116, at 169.
146. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 117

(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
147. BENJAMIN, supranote 101, at 284.
148. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 23 (Adriaan T. Peperzak et al. eds.,
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we think of nature exclusively in terms of natura, neither humans nor
nature will ever be free. Just as the institution of slavery demeans both
slave and master, so too treating nature merely as natura demeans both
nature's creatures and the human beings who exploit or protect them.
From the standpoint of natura, environmentalism will never be more
than an emotionally driven "preference" to protect and preserve some of
Mother Nature's beings while ignoring or decimating others. According
to the scientific maxim "What matters gets measured," the earth has to
get completely mapped and measured before the reality of
environmental degradation can acquire any political currency. 149 Nature
recedes, as it were, so that her beings may be computed and counted in
that simulacrum of her that is called "the environment."' 150 But from the
standpoint of physis, the environmentalist, no less than the antienvironmentalist, freely decides to take a stand within existence, and
steers it, for good or for ill, in a direction. If natura gives humans the
power to dominate nature, physis gives nature and humanity the warrant,
and the responsibility, to be what they are becoming together.
Let's be clear: We do not advocate an attitude towards nature that
makes it into a "utopian realm of hope" that would miraculously rescue
people from the coldness of the market, and from an increasingly
frenetic home life that is being "devoured by the monster of
competition."' 51Nor do we idolize nature the way certain fascist writers
did, as a mystical place where blood and race are linked to soil, and
where sentimentality for one's "natural" land leads to brutality in
defending and extending it.' 52 The longing to fly to nature, and to drown
one's individuality and responsibilities in it by becoming "one with
nature," has nothing to do with our concept of freedom for
responsibility. We say, on the contrary, that an awareness of nature as
physis can bring human beings genuinely back to their home and work,
back to their individuality, and, more importantly, back to a sense of
responsibility. Being attuned to nature as physis does not automatically
make us free and responsible to any particular being or segment of
nature. Rather, it makes us responsible for the nature that we ourselves

149. See, e.g., Earth Observation:Flying Blind, THE ECONOMIST, July 26, 2003, at 73-74.

150. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 26, at 244 (commenting on the "unfathomable, essential
difference between the relationship to a 'world' [Welibezug] and to an 'environment'
[ Umgebungsbezug]").
151. Leo Lowenthal, Knut Hamsun, in THE ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT SCHOOL READER, supra note

65, at 319, 322 (attributing this attitude to Ibsen).
152. Id. (criticizing the work of the proto-fascist Scandinavian writer Knut Hamsun).
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manifest by our actions and inactions. We are like architects whose
buildings are fated to be lived in by everyone and everything. The
thought of nature as physis yields the chance to see oneself and one's
choices as mattering to history. While this chance does not necessarily
lead to tree-hugging or a sense of stewardship over nature, neither does
it necessarily lead to their opposites. And that is precisely why we need
the concept of nature as physis: to reawaken the monumental insight that
we have, indeed that we are, our possibilities.
The freedom of which we are speaking transcends technological
thinking to participate as a creative actor in an ever-blossoming world
that no single person ever "selects," but for which everyone is,
paradoxically, responsible. Choosing freedom thus means saying "Yes!"
to the manner in which you-and-nature continue to persist in being. It
means first of all having the time and the inclination to think, and form
an idea of, the ultimate end of technology. It also means holding the
unity that is the world-and-you accountable for having ignored the
question of ultimate ends for so very, very long. Although we risk being
mocked in repeating Marcuse's words, in an object world that is at once
humanized and naturalized in this way one can begin to sense "that an
electric garbage disposal unit has a 'soul,' that there can be tenderness in
an automobile, and that a bulldozer can not only pulverize but also
restore nature."' 153 In freedom for responsibility, we forget that
everything is caused, and we make decisions that destiny fulfills as
freedom's inescapable counterpart. Only the one who succumbs to the
belief that technological thinking is inevitable surrenders to fate. But
destiny is beyond fate. As Martin Buber puts it, "destiny is not a dome
pressed tightly down on the world of men," but rather freedom's very
meaning and fulfillment.' 54 Human beings who are free for
responsibility believe that destiny needs them rather than controls them.
Genuine freedom of this sort is hard to glimpse and maintain in the
best of circumstances, though, and it is especially hard for those whose
daily struggle for existence is more than just an abstraction written about
in an academic paper. We must now confront the relation between what
Roosevelt called "freedom from want" 155 and the ultimate end of
153. MARCUSE, supranote 2, at 133.
154. MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU 63 (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., Scribner Classics 2000)
(1958).

155. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Four Freedoms Speech, 1941, in 2 THE PEOPLE SHALL
JUDGE: READINGS ON THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN POLICY 751, 756 (The Staff, Social Sciences,
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technology that we have identified, freedom for responsibility. Although
these two freedoms are not the same, we will claim that they are bound
to one another inextricably.
V.

THE RELATION BETWEEN FREEDOM FOR
RESPONSIBILITY AND FREEDOM FROM NECESSITY

Although there is probably nothing that "bores the ordinary man more
than the cosmos,,56 as Walter Benjamin once remarked, it nevertheless
is true that we are cosmologically responsible for the shape of our world
whether or not we are aware of it, or bored by it. And it is also true that
there is no logically necessary connection between the consciousness
that one is free for responsibility (as we have described it) and whether
one's material life circumstances place one comfortably beyond the
struggle for existence. Experience teaches that even a poor person or a
miserable slave can become a philosopher.' 57 Nevertheless, neither the
threat nor the reality of an empty belly correlates well with a sense of
responsibility that extends beyond finding the next meal. Although the
Stoic's advice always to identify the real with the desirable may bring
occasional spells of tranquility to the souls of the unhappy and the
downtrodden,
it is also a recipe for resignation to the effects of
technological thinking. From the standpoint of genuine freedom,
acceptance of the status quo is the same as a guilty complicity in its
perpetuation.
Before people can make a mature decision about the ultimate value of
the world that technological thinking has made, they must have both
time for reflection and the inclination to reflect. The former is
determined by necessity, whether real or artificially perpetuated-a
point that we will return to shortly. But the latter requires the mind to
make a decisive break with the self-evident naturalness of the world.
Only such a break gives thought the critical distance that is necessary to
think in terms of technology's ultimate end. Yet how very hard this is!
According to Max Weber's well-known thesis, the "worldly asceticism,"

156. WALTER BENJAMIN, TIE ARCADES PROJECT 102 (Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin
trans., 1999).
157. For example, the great stoic philosopher Epictetus was a slave. Moses Hadas, Introduction
to ESSENTIAL WORKS OF STOICISM, at vii, xv (Moses Hadas ed., 1961).

158. "Seek not that the things which happen should happen as you wish; but wish the things
which happen to be as they are, and you will have a tranquil flow of life." Epictetus, The Manual, in
ESSENTIAL WORKS OF STOICISM, supra note 157, at 85, 87.
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which is characteristic of the earliest stages of capitalist production in
Europe, had a religious basis. For the Puritan, Weber writes, "labour
came to be considered in itselt the end of life."15 9 The early, religiously
motivated capitalist saw repression of all forms of "spontaneous,
impulsive enjoyment" as a moral imperative,' 60 in part because he
161
thought "[u]nwillingness to work is symptomatic of the lack of grace."
The decline and disappearance of this religious basis of early capitalism
did not, however, diminish the social importance of work in capitalist
production. Nor did it alter the attitude of technological thinking about
the relationship between work and worth. As Weber puts it, in two oftcited passages: "The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced
to,' ' 162 and "the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our lives

like the ghost of dead religious beliefs."' 163 The individual who does not
experience the need to work as a religious duty "generally abandons the
attempt to justify it at all,"' 164 says Weber, thereby confirming our earlier
hypothesis that one of the prime effects of modern technology is to
channel mental energy away from the consideration and formulation of
ultimate ends. People learn that if they think too consistently and too
vigorously about their life and where it is going, they can cause
themselves all kinds of short-term inconvenience, without any assurance
that things can be improved.
Weber's central insight that reason's capacity to think about ultimate
ends atrophies wherever technological thinking holds sway suggests that
a precondition for the recognition and spread of the genuine freedom
that we have attempted to uncover-freedom for responsibility-is a
material way of life that has been released from the grip of what
Marcuse calls "surplus-repression.' ' 65 Work is repressive to the extent
that it forecloses the natural and creative ends that individuals would
pursue if their time were truly their own. And it ceases to be repressive
whenever an increase in the leisure time available to individuals,
corresponding to overall increases in the efficiency of socially necessary
labor, is interpreted as a fundamental human right and a cause for

159. WEBER, supra note 9, at 159.
160. Id. at 119.
161. Id, at 159.
162. Id. at 181.
163. Id. at 182.
164. Id.
165. MARCUSE, supra note 2, at 22, 140.
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celebration, rather than as an occasion for shame and self-hatred on
account of being "unproductive" or out-of-work.
As the overall amount of time required for socially necessary work
continues to decrease as a consequence of automation and other
technological developments, technological thinking is responsible for
allowing the realm of unnecessary repression continually to grow: as if
the two were inversely (and perversely) correlated. For despite the fact
that the overall efficiency of the system has improved, the system still
requires its unemployed members to "earn a living" in some job or other,
no matter how degrading and unnecessary it may be when considered
from the standpoint of satisfying vital human needs. Enter the
McDonaldization of the workforce in the form of low-paying service
jobs, the growth of part-time employment without benefits, and the
frantic pace of a work ethic that is keyed to the norm of producing shortterm profits for shareholders. This surplus repression is irrational from
the standpoint of any ultimate end that values humans over things, since
increased technological efficiency in the production and distribution of
necessary goods ought to lead to more freedom from necessity, rather
than the same amount or less.
Technological thinking makes us prove our worth, to others and to
ourselves, in the labor market. But why should the labor market decide
our worth if a free human life is the ultimate end of socially necessary
labor, rather than just a means to the end of production for its own sake?
In a recent essay on Marcuse's thought, Jirgen Habermas refers to a
widespread estimate that in the countries comprising the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 166 the gross
national product could theoretically be produced by twenty percent of
those able to work. 167 The social meaning of this estimate is obvious
from the standpoint of any plausible non-Puritanical conception of
technology's ultimate end. As Habermas says, with notable
understatement, "if a constantly increasing part of the working
population becomes 'superfluous' for the reproduction of society, the
close connection between occupational success and social recognition

166. Thirty member-states belong to the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech

Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. See
http://www.nationmaster.com/index.php?kp=OECD (last visited Dec. 23, 2003).
167. Jurgen Habermas, The Different Rhythms of Philosophy and Politicsfor Herbert Marcuse on
His 100th Birthday, in MARCUSE, supranote 2, at 233, 236.
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can hardly be maintained." 168 And even if the estimate on which
Habermas relies is off by a lot, it cannot reasonably be denied that
technological improvements in the efficiency of production and
distribution are tending in the direction he describes. Nor can it be
denied that we are doing very little to anticipate and prepare for the
effects that this technological cornucopia will (or should) have on the
relations between work and worth, rich and poor, and Self and Other.
Instead, we seem content to accept an absurd state of affairs in which
"the power of the system over human beings
increases with every step
' 69
nature."'
of
power
the
from
away
take
they
Habermas is speaking primarily about the surplus repression of work
in highly developed nations. Looking beyond repressive conditions
there, one encounters a similar but far more brutal surplus repression in
undeveloped and developing regions. This happens to be a world where
a large portion of the human population is ravaged by curable
diseases, 170 where eight hundred million people suffer from avoidable
hunger and malnutrition, 171 where 1.2 billion people live on less than one
dollar per day, 172 and where poor working parents all too often have to
make the untenable (and technologically unnecessary) choice between
protecting their children from harm, including taking care of them when
they are ill, and keeping their jobs. 173 The fact that in such a world
technological thinking considers overcapacity in the American
automobile industry, currently at twenty percent and growing, to be bad
news174 speaks volumes. This fact should be more of a cause for global
168. Id.
169. HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 7, at 30-31.
170. Consider the example of tuberculosis: "The world observed World TB Day on March 24, the
deadly yet curable disease which has infected one third [of the] world population and kills three
million people every year." Timely Advice, THE INT'L NEWS (INTERNET EDITION), Mar. 25, 2003, at
http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/mar2003-daily/25-03-2003/oped/editorial.htm.
171. Beth Potier, UN's Diouf Addresses Hunger: "The World Hunger Problem Is Clearly
Political, Not
Technical,"
HARV.
U.
GAZETTE,
Feb.
6.
2003,
available at

http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2003/02.06/10-hunger.html.
The article notes that equal
distribution of all the world's food supply would "provide everyone on the planet with a robust
2,800 calories per day, a 17 percent increase from 30 years ago." Id.
172. Robert Hunter Wade, The Rising Inequality of World Income Distribution, 38 FIN. & DEV.
No.
4
(Dec.
2001)
(figures
from
the
World
Bank),
available at
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ipe/inequality.htm.
173. Jody Heyman, Families on the Edge, HARV. MAG., July-Aug. 2003, at 50, 53 (reporting on
a global study of this problem and concluding as follows: "The world can afford to ensure adequate
working conditions and social supports for families; what we can't afford is neglect.").
174, CorporateFinances:Less Stretched,for Now, THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 54-55.
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celebration than it is a cause of short-term worry, since it indicates that
technology has at its command an enormous reservoir of untapped
potential that could be used to liberate the universal community of men,
women, and children from the oppression of an unnecessary struggle for
existence. Where, except in a madhouse, could advertisements for
$3,000 watches and $17,000 pearls sit side-by-side with a news report
about the cash crisis in global AIDS funding, 175 without evoking the
profoundest sense of shame and outrage? Where, except in a world that
has been blinded to ultimate ends by technological thinking, could the
observation that the annual output of Liberia "is roughly what
Americans spend on skiing equipment' 7 6 fail to elicit feelings of guilt
and disgust? When we in the prosperous West think of AIDS in Africa
and the millions we allow to die there, the ugly suspicion arises that this
"letting die" is, as Jacques Derrida says, a form of killing. 77 The
suspicion arises that, in an era of preventable death and disease, "Thou
shalt not kill" means that thou shalt cause these others to live.
If the Enlightenment watered the acorn that became the oak of
technological thinking (the essence of modem technology), then it also
gave us the profound idea and aspiration of universal human
emancipation. In Kant's universal ethical subject, bound to be otherregarding by reason in the form of the Categorical Imperative, 178 in
Hegel's idea that the master-slave relation is destined to be dialectically
overcome (Aufgehoben) by a higher stage of development in which
universal human recognition prevails, 7 9 in Montesquieu's correlation of
the ability to be free with true freedom of will, 180 and in Marx's
description of freedom as the development of human potentiality for its
own sake, beyond the realm of necessity, 181 one can find the origins of
the tattered but still lofty progressive notion that technology should aim
at universal human emancipationfrom necessity. The universality of this

175. See N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at A2-A4.
176. Why Liberia Is Not Somalia, THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 11.
177. GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JORGEN
HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 108 (2003).
178. KANT, supranote 101, at 195.
179. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 111-19 (A.V. Miller trans., 1977); see also
ALEXANDRE KOJtVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF HEGEL 43-44 (James H. Nichols, Jr.,
trans., 1969).

180. "La libertd ne peut consister qu "bpouvoirfaire ce que 'on doit vouloir" ("Liberty consists
in being able to do what one ought to will"), quoted in ARENDT, supranote 83, at 161.
181. T.B. Bottomore, Introduction to MARX, supra note 104, at vii, x.
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ideal of universal freedom from necessity is both challenged and
measured by the way in which the parts of the historical whole relate to
those who, as 2i~ek puts it, lie "at the bottom."'1 82 In short, the ideal
requires an effort to satisfy vital human needs on a global scale.
The particular historical forms in which the aspiration for universal
human freedom has appeared to date-primarily economic liberalism
rooted in mass democracy and totalitarian state communism-do not
exhaust its potential to inspire us. If economic liberalism finds freedom
only in its negative sense (the right to be left alone by the state in the
pursuit of market relations), and if state communism finds it in the
perverted positive sense of an enforced conformity to social goals, then
the ideal of universal freedom from necessity needs to find its
idealization and its expression in a way that transcends both discourses.
For when instrumental reason separates from the ultimate purpose of
thought, the ideal of knowledge through a "method" becomes
tautological, "since it does no more than fulfill the demands 184
of
183 The biblical admonition "Seek, and ye shall find'
method."
becomes the guideline to seek only what you will find according to this
or that "useful" method.
It is unlikely that help in our project will be found in the direction of
modem analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy's primary tendency is
to deflate universals like "freedom," "universal humanity," and
"technology," reducing them to descriptions of particular given
operations of speech and conduct: Wittgenstein's language-games,' 85 for
example. Marcuse calls this mode of philosophizing "operational,"
defined as the tendency to make concepts synonymous with a
corresponding set of operations. 186 And while this technique may clarify
and correctly describe linguistic usages, 187 in the end the equation of
language and its function is complicit in perpetuating the dominion of
technological thinking. For the function of a thing in a society that is
governed by technological thinking is itself technological, a point that is
182. See 2I2EK, supra note 40, at 224.

183. ADORNO, supra note 24, at 76.
184. Matthew 7:7 (King James).
185. See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, at 5e (G.E.M. Anscombe
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187. Id. at 203; see also ADORNO, supranote 24, at 76 ("[T]he only productive knowledge is that
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character.").
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missed or glossed over by such thinkers as Ronald Dworkin, who
equates the meaning of his philosophical concept of "right answers" in
law with the "ordinary" usage of lawyers.' 88 In law, operationalism
expresses itself in the form of Hohfeld's idea of "operative facts": these
are never meant to be objective indices of being or reality, but are only
the result of a legal operation that adduces exclusively those kinds of
facts that the law predetermines as sufficient to alter legal relations. 189 If
the philosophical concept of right answers to legal problems is rigidly
circumscribed by what everybody in "real life" says it is in this manner,
then there is nothing for critical thought to do except throw in the towel
and become a lawyer in ultimate service to the given reality.190
Universals like "freedom" have always had the potential to reproach
what is by juxtaposing it with what might be. Consider, for instance,
what Martin Luther King, Jr., was able to do with the words "freedom"
and "justice." If legal and philosophical analyses succeed in
demythologizing universals, then they will have rendered them
incapable of invigorating the imagination and moving people to oppose
the given reality. Whether they mean to do so or not, the atrophied kind
of philosophizing and the operational kind of lawyering described in the
previous paragraph tend to make the emancipating effects of universals
harmless to the system. Such thought represses critical reason's ability to
think beyond operational terms by criticizing as "metaphysics,"
"disguised ontology," or "irrelevant" any view that does not accept the
existing order of things, or that chooses to opt out of the stubborn
adherence to immediate facts. That law apologizes for the existing order
in this way is hardly surprising. But when philosophy makes the same
kind of operational moves that law does, it too offers a kind of apology
for the status quo-contrary to the proud idea, originating in Socrates,
that the philosopher's proper role is to act as a gadfly to society and the
state. One feels compelled to wonder (or lament) where critical reason
has gone, until one remembers that even philosophy can succumb to
technological thinking. Beyond all language analysis of this sort, beyond
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law, and beyond all political "third ways,"' 191 we will argue that the idea
of universal freedom from necessity should be seen as genuinely
mythological, and not merely utopian, metaphysical, or juridical.
The distinction between myth and utopia was first drawn in
Reflections on Violence,192 which was written at the beginning of the
twentieth century by Georges Sorel, a French anarchist philosopher and
former civil engineer for the French state. J.B. Priestley once remarked
that if one could only grasp why a retired civil servant wrote such a
book, then the modem age could be understood. 193 In any case, in
Reflections on Violence, Sorel identifies the mythological with the
language and imagery of any individual or social movement that is
convinced things must change, but is not sure how it can be changed. In
contrast, he calls utopian any program of reform that lays down in
advance the exact shape of the world that is to be achieved. 194 Sorel
sharpens this critical distinction in the following passage:
A myth cannot be refuted since it is, at bottom, identical to the
convictions of a group, being the expression of these convictions
in the language of movement; and it is, in consequence,
unanalysable into parts which could be placed on the plane of
historical descriptions. A utopia, on the other hand, can be
discussed like any other social constitution; the spontaneous
movements it presupposes can be compared with those actually
observed in the course of history, and we can in this way
evaluate their verisimilitude; it is possible to refute it by
showing that the economic system on which it has been made to
rest is incompatible with the necessary conditions of modem
production. 195
When mythological thinking becomes utopian it exercises its freedom of
action in a direction. Prior to that, it dwells at a stage where anything is
possible, and nothing is decided yet.
As Sorel's text implies, technological thinking can always discredit

191. The term "third way" refers to the political slogans of those who, like Britain's Tony Blair,
seek to get the votes of disillusioned liberals and middle-of-the-road conservatives by promising the
conservatives capitalism with a compassionate heart, and promising the liberals socialism infused
with "rationality" and market discipline. See Bagehot: A Poodle That Snaps, THE ECONOMIST, July
19, 2003, at 46.
192. GEORGES SOREL, REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE (Jeremy Jennings ed., 1999).
193. Id. (frontispiece).
194. Id. at 27-31.
195. Id. at 29.
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utopias on the ground that they are unrealized or unrealizable ends,
given the present factual starting point. But its attempt to disparage
myths, in Sorel's sense, is always fated to be ineffectual. A myth cannot
be refuted so long as it represents the deepest convictions of those who
196
reject the present state of affairs as beneath the dignity of man.
Technological thinking and mythological thinking both agree that the
realm of facts (the given reality) stands opposed to the realm of myth
(what is not). But technological thinking construes the rational
implication of this opposition to be acquiescence in the status quo,
whereas mythological thinking finds its motives, and its hope, in what is
not yet a reality. Although it may sound like a shocking exaggeration to
say it, only in this way can mythological thought, afloat in a sea of
technological thinking, avoid agreeing with Camus that the last genuine
97
philosophical problem remaining today is whether to commit suicide.'
While Sorel was writing specifically about the conflict, in fin-desibcle Europe, between parliamentary reformism (some of which was
based on utopias) and the revolutionary social movements of his day
(many of which were based on myths), his distinction between myth and
utopia transcends that particular historical context. It gives us a useful
conception of the meaning of responsibility in conditions that appear
impervious to change. For the poverty of any particular utopian vision is
nothing compared to the mythological conviction that the end of
technology is universal human emancipation. And with such a
conviction comes responsibility for the way things are no matter how
difficult or impossible movement in the direction of the myth may now
appear to be. Those in the grip of a fanatical utopian vision are capable
of the most unspeakable outrages, as Sorel correctly observes. 98 This
observation implies the large grain of truth in Nietzsche's aphorism that
"the actualman represents a much higher value than the 'desirable' man
of any ideal hitherto."' 199 Nevertheless, to recognize a particular utopia as
an aim is never a matter of freedom, but of right or wrong judgment, just
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as the power to command is also not a function of freedom, but only of
strength or weakness. 200 Whereas those who are moved by the myth of
universal human emancipation freely accept guilt for the consequences
of what is done and undone in the name of this myth. Like Arendt's
"principle" of freedom,2 °' the mythological does not come from within,
but inspires from without. If the one who believes in universal human
emancipation moves now slowly and incrementally, now rapidly and
radically, such a one always does so in the form of a freedom that knows
itself to be both a "beginning and a beginner,, 20 2 and that knows it alone
is responsible for the world that freedom makes. Such a one knows that
without the violence of change, there can be no progress, and that
without the compassion that comes with a sense of responsibility, there
can be no progress that is worthy of the name. If the only thing worse
that the nonexistence of a just existence for humanity is the nonexistence
' ' 20 3
of what Benjamin calls "the irreducible, total condition that is 'man,
this can only mean that freedom for responsibility holds both justice and
life in a tragic balance.
The myth (in Sorel's sense) that the awesome power of modem
technology can be used to liberate universal humanity from the coils of
necessity thus connects the notion of freedom for responsibility with a
certain kind of ethical responsibility for the Other. We do not refer to
traditional conceptions of ethics based on norms or consequences, but
rather to the radical kind of ethical responsibility that is described in the
work of Emmanuel Levinas. Freedom for responsibility, as we have
portrayed it up until now, is existential freedom: it is linked to the
manifestations of the world (being) before it is linked to any of our
fellow human beings (the Other). But as is more fully explained
elsewhere, 204 Levinas places ethical responsibility for the Other ahead of
any other existential comportment-indeed, he places it in a logical
category that he calls, paradoxically, "otherwise than being. 20 5 While
this is not the place for an extended discussion of the extraordinary
subtlety and originality of Levinas's thought, it is appropriate to say that
his central phenomenological insight is that we feel ethically responsible
200. ARENDT, supra note 83, at 152.
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for our fellow human beings before any explicit calculation based on
legal or moral norms. Indeed, our practice of making explicit, normbased, calculations of whether or not responsibility is owed is one of the
principal ways we avoid or shed this primordial sense of
responsibility. 20 6 Contrary to an entire tradition of political
philosophizing that originated with Hobbes, 20 7 Levinas holds that human
beings always experience themselves as sociable before they experience
themselves as free.20 8
One does not have to rank existential freedom and ethical
responsibility for the Other in terms of priority, however, in order to see
that at the very least the former tends towards the latter, and vice versa.
If I live with a sense of responsibility for the shape of the world, then the
avoidable suffering of others must always show itself as one of the
consequences of my actions and inactions; thus, only if I see myself as a
monster or a swaggering and egoistic Obermensch will I fail to be
moved by their plight. Likewise, the one whose heart always bleeds for
the suffering of others has the strongest of incentives to exercise his
existential freedom by attempting to change any state of affairs that is
responsible for unnecessary suffering.
The connection between freedom and ethical responsibility that has
just been drawn is not offered as a necessary implication. Unlike John
Rawls, we do not seek to deduce from a self-regarding conception of
reason, operating from behind the veil of ignorance, the logical
conclusion that our institutions must be set up in such a way as to
improve the condition of the worst off in society. 20 9 Nietzsche, for one,
would rightly object that the more-than-ample historical record of
human brutality and greed demonstrates that freedom and practical
reason, in the metaphysical sense of will-to-power, tend to negate the
necessity of any such conclusion. 210 Nietzsche to the contrary
notwithstanding, however, not only do we maintain that the connection
we have drawn is plausible "empirically," but also we offer it as deeply
mythological in Sorel's sense.
206. For more on this point, see Louis Wolcher, Human Rights and Human Suffering, in THE
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS (forthcoming Qom, Iran: Mofid University Press
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As for the empirical, we submit as evidence the countless large and
small kindnesses that daily pass between strangers, before being reduced
to "history" and "systems of ethics." We also offer the ubiquitous
phenomena of compassion and conscience in the face of the curable
suffering of others. True compassion is not an experience that transpires
between this person and that person conceived as an I and an It, for the
word "experience" implies the secondary status of the things that are
related through experience. Like Martin Buber's concept of I-Thou,21 '
compassion is not an experience but a primary human relation. It is a
connection that is discovered, not created, a bond that is found, not
forged. Unfortunately, as Buber correctly observes, the development of
the function of experiencing things and using them technologically
comes about mostly through a decrease in the power to discover and
sustain relations of this sort.2 2 The historical struggle for existence and
modem technological thinking, both quintessential examples of
"experiencing and using" in Buber's sense of the abstract I-It relation,
thus tend to drive the primary relation of compassion underground. 1 3
However, we would contend that the depressing historical record of
human selfishness and brutality in our age and prior ages should be seen
as ambiguously relevant counter-evidence at best, especially if we are
right that modem technological thinking artificially perpetuates the
struggle for existence.
But what if we are not right, a critic might ask, as a matter of "fact"
about the central importance of sociality and compassion in the way that
humans are constructed-what then? More important than any proof that
is based on a pessimistic, and ultimately technological, assessment of socalled "human nature," we say that the expression of the intimate linkage
between freedom for responsibility and universal freedom from
necessity is, in the final analysis, profoundly mythological in Sorel's
sense. It represents the conviction of anyone who thinks the world has
gone mad in the many ways that we have attempted to demonstrate. It
authorizes us to say that the meaning of freedom for responsibility
requires freedom from necessity in order to flourish, and naturally leads
to the feeling that one is responsible for the artificial perpetuation of
necessity and unnecessary suffering in the world. It is nothing other than
211. BUBER, supra note 154, at 19-44.
212. Id. at 52.
213. Id. at 54 ("If a man lets [the MIt relation] have the mastery, the continually growing world of
It overruns him and robs him of the reality of his own I, till the incubus over him and the ghost
within him whisper to one another the confession of their non-salvation.").
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the shape of hope for what might be in the face of despair over what is.
VI. CONCLUSION
Let us end where we began, and ask once again: What is the end of
technology? What this question asks in its deepest signification is
nothing technological. Although technology in the largest sense of the
word consists of human beings uncovering beings and making them
accessible, technology as such is not ultimately for the sake of any
particular project or outcome. Technology thus conceived exists
ultimately for the sake of human freedom, which can only express itself
in and by means of technology. Genuine freedom is freedom for
responsibility: the kind that knows that it is freedom itself that constructs
the very obstacles to freedom that continue to confound a suffering
humanity. Freedom from necessity is not a logical condition of the
possibility of freedom for responsibility, but it is nonetheless an
empirical condition of the latter's spreading and flourishing. The harried
and overworked, the hungry, the sick, and the downtrodden: their
gnawing need to survive a struggle for existence that modern
technological progress could make unnecessary relentlessly devours
their chances to live in freedom. Thus, not only does freedom begin only
when "the I-will and the I-can coincide," 2 14 as Arendt puts it, but it is
also the case that those who are already free for responsibility wear other
people's avoidable lack of freedom as a shameful stain on their sense of
responsibility.
Marx once uttered the profound truth that "we have to emancipate
ourselves before we can emancipate others. 21 5 If this essay has achieved
its goal, then its most important argument will have landed on fertile
soil: The grip that technological thinking exercises on our imagination
must be broken, and technology must return to the status of a means to
the ultimate end of universal human emancipation. All progressive
thought about the consummation and the ultimate end of technology
requires, first and foremost, what Marcuse calls a "consciousness of the
blatant contradiction between the scientific-technological possibilities
and their destructive and repressive realization., 21 6 This consciousness
means the ability to think the category of individualism beyond the
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making of market choices that implement a life of unnecessary toil and
servitude. It means defining individuality in terms of being able to speak
one's own language, to have one's own emotions, and to follow one's
own heart. And it requires the conviction that true individualism can
only begin beyond the realm of necessity: a truth that well-paid tenured
legal academics ought to know from personal experience. To those who
would disparage and scorn this vision of human emancipation as
unrealistic and naYvely utopian, we say: So what? We have seen the
world that technological thinking has made, and the irrationality of its
rationalism shows itself to the faculty of judgment in a way that is every
bit as dysutopic in fact as our idea of universal human emancipation is
mythological and "unrealistic."
Like Kierkegaard's "knight of faith, 2 17 the ones who are free for
responsibility in the way we have attempted to describe make a kind of
three-fold movement. First concentrating their infinite desire for a world
that transcends technological thinking by acting to achieve such a world,
they quickly learn the tragedy of unintended consequences when their
best-laid plans go awry. This leads them, sadly, to a second movement:
resignation to the finite reality that their actions are always bound to
produce imperfect, and sometimes even disastrous, results, and that they
are responsible for these results. But then occurs "still another
movement more wonderful than all," as Kierkegaard puts it. 2 8 After the
two-fold movement of desire and resignation, the ones who are free for
responsibility absurdly accept the truth of their impossible aspiration for
universal human emancipation. They do not (necessarily) do this
because they have faith in a God who is believed to make all things
possible, as Kierkegaard himself would have it, 2 19 or because they are
scientifically convinced in the inevitability of progress towards universal
human emancipation, as were Hegel and Marx. Indeed, they know that
the source of true freedom remains present, as Arendt puts it, "even
when political life has become petrified and political action impotent to
interrupt automatic processes. ' 220 They accept the truth of their
aspirationfor universal human emancipation simply by virtue of their
irrationalfaith in the fundamentalgoodness of humanity itself.
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The empirical possibility that human beings cannot enjoy the
continuing benefits of modem technology without suffering the
continuing hegemony of technological thinking is simply too horrible to
be believed or credited, and this is not just because positivism and
empiricism, as tools of technological thinking, tend to conflate the nonactual with the impossible.221 Cicero's bold remark to the effect that he
would rather go astray with Plato than hold true views with Plato's
opponents 222 captures the essence of our attitude towards the positivist's
"bitter with the sweet" argument. For the terrible idea that technical
progress can never be humanized and naturalized in the ways that we
have tried to describe in this essay represents the death of all hope, and
of all critical thinking. Sadly, the realization of this idea would truly
represent a miserable human history that ends not with a bang, but a
whimper.2 23
Pursuing no conquest, the social movement to pacify the unnecessary
struggle for existence in the developed world, and to satisfy, by means of
technology, vital human needs on a worldwide scale needs to make no
plans for utilizing its victories. 224 This statement does not reflect an
attitude of recklessness and irresponsibility, nor does it abjure the need
for careful calculation and planning. Rather, the statement is predicated
on the truisms that "universal" means universal, and that the very notion
of "victory" implies the antithesis of universality: the scission of
humanity into permanent camps of winners and losers. It rejects the
egoistical sentiment "after me the deluge, 2 25 in favor of a slogan that in
its deepest sense transcends the status of an aphorism to become
mythological. The slogan's particular expression (though not its content)
was first rendered by Herbert Spencer. 226 It is just this: No one can be
perfectly free until all are free.
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